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PREDICTING CRIME
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz*

Predictionmarkets have been proposedfor a variety ofpublic policy purposes, but
no one has considered their application in perhaps the most obvious policy
area.: crime. This Article proposes and examines the use of prediction markets to
forecast crime rates and the potential impact on crime policy, such as changes in
resource allocation,policing strategies, sentencing, post-conviction treatment, and
so on.
First, we argue that prediction markets are especially useful in crime rate
forecasting and criminal policy analysis because information relevant to
decisionmakers is voluminous, dispersed, and difficult to process efficiently. After
surveying the currentforecasting practices and techniques, we examine the use of
standardprediction markets-such as those being used to predict everything from
the weather to political elections to flu outbreaks-as a method of forecasting
crime rates of various kinds.
Second, we introduce some theoretical improvements to existing prediction
markets that are designed to address specific issues that arise in crime rate
forecasting. Specifically, we develop the idea of prediction market event studies
that could test the influence of real and hypothetical policy changes on crime
rates. Given the high costs of changingpolicies, such as issuing a moratorium on
the death penalty or lowering mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes,
these markets provide a useful toolforpolicymakers operatingunder uncertainty.
But, the event studies and the other policy markets we propose face a big hurdle
because predictions about the future imbed assumptions about the very policy
choices they are designed to measure. We offer a method by which policymakers
can interpret market forecasts in a way that isolates or unpacks underlying crime
factorsfrom expected policy responses, even when the responses are dependent on
the crimefactors.
Finally, we discuss some practical issues about designing these markets, such as
how to ensure liquidity, how to structure contracts, and the optimal market scope.
We conclude with a modest proposalfor experimenting with markets in this policy
area.
*
University of Chicago Law School, University of Pennsylvania Wharton
School of Business, and Dartmouth College, respectively. We are grateful to the Sarah
Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation for research support.
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INTRODUCTION
Science fiction author Philip K. Dick proposed that in fifty years or so our
society will have the ability to predict certain crimes before they happen.'
Policymnakers; today, however, do not have certain knowledge of future
events-like what the crime rate will be in Chicago in the next hour, next year, or
next decade-so they have to resort to less precise forecasting tools. These tools
include using gut feeling, examining what has been done in the past, and modeling
based on maps overlaid with things like past crimes, the location of liquor stores or
demographic data. Policymnakers extrapolate from past events, as they must, but do
so in a manner that is not systematic, transparent, or likely to lead to the best
available forecast. Based on a review of the extant literature and discussions with
various officials at all jurisdiction levels across the country, it is highly doubtful
that any serious, systematic forecasting of crime rates is done anywhere. It is safe
to say that the current approach to forecasting crime, insofar as it exists, is
extremely crude.2 This is deeply puzzling. Public safety is the most important
metric for elected officials (especially at the local level) and allocating scarce
crime-fighting resources efficiently is an essential element of achieving public
safety. There are several possible reasons for this failure.
First, existing tools may simply be insufficient to provide meaningful
forecasts. Technical forecasting, using economics models, computer technology,
and mapping tools, is a modem phenomenon, 3 and these methods are unproven,
difficult to interpret, and expensive to set up and operate, especially for
communities with tight budgets. Although New York City and some other large
cities have deployed mapping programs and management tools designed to
improve resource allocation and planning, these are by and large backward
looking, rarely theoretically sound, and subject to the biases and idiosyncratic
tendencies of the few individuals who operate them.
No police department or other law enforcement agency has, to our
knowledge, deployed any of the emergent forecasting models being developed by
academic criminologists. Since cost is not likely a barrier in these cases as most of
the software and ideas are free, it is possible to conclude that these methods are
too crude, too complex, or too unreliable to be valuable. In other words, the costs
of implementation currently exceed the expected benefits, which actually may be
so low that even if the total cost of deployment were near zero, the tools would add
little or no value.

1.
See PHILIP K. DICK, THE MIN'ORITY REPORT (2002). The short story was made
into a popular 2002 movie directed by Steven Spielberg. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. 2002).
2.
For example, mapping crimes by police precinct or beat and then assigning
more resources to the areas with the most hits in the past.
3.
The first known academic paper on crime forecasting is Andreas M.
Olligschlaeger, Artiticial Neural Networks and Crime Mapping, in

CRIME MAPPING &

313 (David Weisburd & Tom McEwen eds., 1998).
4.
For example, FacilityCop, a software-forecasting tool developed at Temple
University, is available as a free download. See Facility Cop Software, Temple Univ. Dep't
of Criminal Justice, http://www.temple.edu/cj/faccop/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
CRIME PREVENTION
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A second and related reason why technical and systematic forecasting
appears to be rarely used may be because it takes place in an informal, traditionbased manner inside the minds of key decisionmakers. The practice of forecasting
is as old as crime regulation and policing, since all policymakers (from the
governor to local police chiefs) must make decisions about how to allocate scarce
resources. 5 In the absence of specific forecasting tools, the most likely methods of
predicting crime are human-based pattern recognition and the gut instincts of
decisionmakers. In other words, police chiefs have a feeling about where crimes
will occur, or the governor has an idea about crime patterns or the impact of tools
like the death penalty or parole, and these officials use these feelings and ideas to
make policy decisions.
This kind of decision-making may be successful in some instances, given
that the decisiornakers have experience, and given that it entails some ex post
political accountability checks. On the other hand, these techniques will
undoubtedly be crude, subject to political biases, and possibly systematically
skewed by decision-making heuristics and errors to which well-meaning
decisionmnakers are invariably subject. Forecasts may also be distorted in cases
where the private value of a particular decision exceeds its social value.6 Although
this type of forecasting should not be quickly discarded,7 we show an alternative to
(or more likely a complement to) gut-based decisions that will not only improve
current forecasts, as well as accountability and transparency, but will also expand
opportunities for policymakers to "experiment" with policy changes.
A final reason for the lack of systematic forecasting may have to do with
something we might call "politics" or "public choice." There are many possible
explanations that fit under this rubric: it may be politically difficult to justify (to
colleagues, constituents, or subordinates) an investment in forecasting over, for
instance, another cop on the beat; police unions or police management may resist
changes that are socially efficient but have high private costs for them; certain
political constituencies might not want crime predictions, especially for certain
areas of a city or state, to be publicly available in such a conspicuous form;
decisionmakers also might not want information on crime in particular
neighborhoods to be forecast, since this might scare off developers or new
residents and might discourage current residents by revealing that current policies

5.
This includes: the number of prosecutors, the amount of jail space, the
number and type of vehicles deployed, the number of cops on the beat, the kind of detection
technologies deployed, and so forth.
6.
These barriers to effective decision-making, extracted largely from work in
psychology, sociology, and economics, are described in detail in the legal literature. See,
e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (identifying numerous
mental and psychological heuristics that limit human abilities to reason rationally).
7.
One is reminded of the "Moneyball" phenomenon, where baseball executive
Billy Beane showed how new, formal methods of data analysis can radically change the
conventional wisdom about how to solve a particular problem-in Beane's case, how to

evaluate inchoate talent in prospective big leaguers. See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEY-BALL: THE
ART OF WmINI AN UNFAIR GAM~E (2003). We believe our proposal has the ability to
change long-standing practices in the same way that Beane's application of Sabremetrics
did for baseball.
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are failing despite (or because of) city efforts; the whole concept of betting on
crime might be normatively troubling to some citizens.
Given these possible reasons for the'apparent lack of systematic crime
forecasting, this Article contributes a new forecasting tool-crime-forecasting
prediction markets-that may be more affordable, accessible, and accurate for
decisionmakers. We propose two general types of markets: the first are simple
crime rate prediction markets that are similar to those being used currently to
predict everything from the weather to political elections to flu outbreaks; the
second are various contingent markets or prediction market event studies that can
be used to inform policy decisions on subjects like sentencing, the death penalty,
the use of surveillance technology, and so on.
This Article argues that these markets could be used to forecast crime and
inform crime policy in a vastly more reliable and informative manner than current
practices. Instead of decisionmakers relying on certain individuals, a certain
model, a certain theory, or certain information, they can rely on a market-based
aggregation of available information. This is especially the case in light of several
technical innovations we contribute that (1) allow policymnakers to interpret market
prices even when the prices include imbedded predictions about future policy
changes and (2) allow policymnakers to estimate the causal impact of hypothetical
policy changes on crime rates.
Part I of the Article describes the basic theoretical underpinnings of
prediction markets. These markets are fairly well understood, but we provide some
additional thoughts of particular relevance to crime prediction markets. We also
introduce the current methods for forecasting crime, along with their limitations. In
Part 11, we make two contributions to the prediction markets and crime forecasting
literature. First, we describe how prediction markets can be tailored to address
specific policy issues that require improved methods of predicting the future, using
crime policy as an example. Second, we introduce some theoretical improvements
to existing prediction markets that are designed to address specific issues that arise
in policy-making applications. Specifically, we offer a method by which
policymakers can interpret market forecasts in a way that isolates or unpacks
underlying crime factors from expected policy responses, even when the responses
are dependent on the crime factors. Using this mechanism, it may be possible to
decentralize crime policy in the same way that monetary policy has been
transformed by the introduction of forward markets for interest rates, inflation, and
other macroeconomic indicators.
We also develop the idea of prediction market event studies that can be
used to test the influence of policy changes, both real and hypothetical, on crime
rates. It is this latter possibility that unlocks the tine power of prediction markets,
as we show a way in which policymnakers can get broad-based estimates of
changes to public safety enforcement before they are implemented. Given the life
and death implications that may arise from changes in policy, as well as the high
cost of making changes in resource allocation, public safety is an area that may be
plagued by insufficient experimentation. The models we offer are a way around
this problem.
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We then discuss some design issues and objections in Part 111. Part IV
concludes with a modest proposal and some open questions.
1. FORECASTING & PREDICTION MARKETS
A. The Forecasting Problem and How Prediction Markets Can Solve It
The challenges involved in predicting crime rates or the impact of
different crime policies are very similar to those in other forecasting domains.
Classic examples include predicting sales of a product, changes in interest rates,
the likelihood of a terrorist attack, or the outcome of political elections. In each of
these cases, the inputs needed to generate a reliable forecast may be skewed by a
variety of factors, some of which might be benign but disruptive, and some of
which may be selfish and opportunistic. 8 For example, relevant information may
be quite dispersed; true experts may be difficult to discern from over-confident
charlatans; a wide variety of alternative models may exist, but no obvious "best"
model may prevail; political or social concerns may lead some to misrepresent
their information; decision-making heuristics and barriers to information may
inhibit analysis by key decisionmakers; and there may be few incentives for
uncovering new information and developing or identifying improved models.
Given the similarities in the forecasting problems across these varied areas, it is
not surprising that a recent forecasting innovation-prediction markets-has been
used in each of these cases. 9
As detailed sufficiently elsewhere, prediction markets are simply futures
markets where the payoffs of the contracts traded are tied to a future event, such as
how many printers will be sold in the next quarter, who will win the next
presidential election, or the number of homicides committed in Chicago in the next
year.' 0 By constructing these futures contracts in a transparent manner, researchers
can interpret the price of contracts as a market-aggregated forecast. For instance, if
a contract that pays $1 if next year's burglary rate is higher than last year's is
currently trading at $0.95, then the market is suggesting that it is extremely likely
(about 95% likely) that the number of burglaries will rise. If an array of
8.
Benign but disruptive factors include various decision-making heuristics that
limit the ability of individuals to make good decisions. For example, the evidence suggests
that individuals overestimate the likelihood of events that have occurred recently or to them.
This is known as the familiarity bias. Selfish and opportunistic factors are where individuals
use forecasts not as a prediction mechanism, but to serve a personal interest. Sabotage is the
most obvious example, whereby an individual would predict, say a drop in the price of a
contract, and then act to make the price drop. The sabotage problem in the context of
prediction markets is discussed in the literature. See Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd
Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1343,
1384-85 (2007) (concluding that concerns are overblown). Additionally, we cover it briefly
in Part IV below.
9.
See generally Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1349-50
(describing markets at Hewlett-Packard used to more accurately predict printer sales than
existing methods); Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, PredictionMarkets, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP.
107 (2004) (describing existing prediction markets and their general application).
10.
See, e.g., Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1349-50; Wolfers &
Zitzewitz, supra note 9, at 110.
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criminologists, police chiefs, statisticians, and the general public all trade in such a
market, then the price will come to reflect an aggregation of the various
information sets and models used by each of these traders, leading the marketbased forecast to reflect "the wisdom of crowds."" If the market is fairly
efficient, 12 we can be fairly certain that there is no one with much better
information about the future event; otherwise, they would have the incentive (be it
financial, reputational, or otherwise) to trade on the information, which would then
13
change the price or forecast.
Of course, there are many reasons to be concerned that prediction
markets, like all markets, are not perfectly efficient.'14 As such, the usefulness of
prediction markets for crime rate forecasting (or any other forecasting purpose) is
an unresolved empirical question. Nevertheless, the policy-relevant question is not
whether prediction markets are accurate predictors of crime rates, but whether
prediction markets yield more accurate crime rate forecasts than alternative
approaches. To our knowledge crime-forecasting prediction markets have never
been run, but there is a large amount of data on the relative accuracy of prediction
markets compared with econometric models, experts, polls, and averages of
forecasters. As Robin Hanson summarizes the evidence, these markets do very
well:
So far, speculative markets have done well in every known
head-to-head field comparison with other forecasting institutions.
11.

See

JAMES

SUROwIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS

(2004) (showing that in

many cases, the average guess of relatively uninformed lay persons outperforms expert
estimates); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE

(2006).

12.
The theoretical insight of prediction markets is simple: the price mechanism,
that is, prices revealed through voluntary and competiiive market-based exchanges, is the
best available means for aggregating private and public information. See F.A. Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. EcoN. Rnv. 519, 526 (1945). As a theoretical matter,
Hayek introduced this concept in his criticism of central planning, but its intellectual origins
go back to Adam Smith and further, and surely its practical application is nearly as old as
human society. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM (1945). In his famous work, Hayek
showed that no central authority, be it the Soviet Gosplan or the Chicago Police
Department, can aggregate and process all of the information relevant to deciding how to
solve a complex issue, like how much bread or how many police officers are needed in a
city at a particular time and location. The economists' enthusiasm for markets is premised,
in part, on the efficient markets hypothesis: in efficient markets, the price will reflect the
best available guess as to value. In the context of forecasting, in a truly efficient prediction
market, the market price will be the best predictor of the event, and no combination of
alternative prediction models or data on criminal, demographic, economic, or other trends,
can be used to improve on the market-generated forecasts.
13.
For example, using the example above, if one was supremely confident that
the burglary rate was going to be lower next year, seeing the market price of $0.95 for
contracts paying $1 if the rate was higher, one would sell "short" these contracts at $0.95,
expecting them to fall in price so as to profit by the drop.
14.
Markets can be imperfect owing to insufficient liquidity, manipulation,
inadequate or excessive regulation, poor design, behavioral heuristics of participants, and so
on. These problems are as true, but no more true, for prediction markets as for other
markets.
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Orange Juice futures improve on National Weather Service
forecasts, horse race markets beat horse race experts, Oscar markets
beat columnist forecasts, gas-demand markets beat gas-demand
experts, stock markets beat the official NASA panel at fingering the
guilty company in the Challenger accident, election markets beat
and corporate sales markets beat official
national opinion polls,
5
corporate forecasts.'1
Cass Sunstein's recent book, Infiotopia, and a series of academic articles
by Sunstein and others detail at length the theoretical and practical reasons for
these results.'16 One reason is described by the Condercet Jury Theorem, which
shows that, given certain reasonable assumptions, the probability of reaching the
correct result dramatically increases as the number of individuals participating in a
7
decision increases.'1
Prediction markets allow any and all voices to be heard, which under the
Condercet Jury Theorem should induce a movement toward better forecast
estimates. In addition, Sunstein shows that in the absence of market mechanisms:
mental heuristics inhibit information flow to decisionmakers; point estimates by
experts or decision-making groups are less reliable than the smoothed aggregations
of everyone's opinion; and even the most well-designed and well-informed groups
of experts cannot in general match the power of market-based information
aggregators.
Prediction markets work because they address several key factors relevant
to accurate forecasting. First, they aggregate information from any and all persons
holding valuable information, regardless of their identity, their social status, their
position in a decision-making hierarchy, or the basis for their information. The
anonymity of trades permits all voices to be heard with less cost for the speakers or
providers of information. This can be thought of as the debiasing of information
hierarchies. Debiasing allows those who might be marginalized. to contribute, but
also maintains the ability of those who rightfully hold privileged positions in the
hierarchy (say because of good access to information or a history of good
predictions) to have a greater say. Markets can accomplish this dual role by
allowing anyone to participate anonymously (thus avoiding social hierarchies from
limiting information flow) and by simulatenously rewarding individuals based on
the size and correctness of their bets (thus allowing individuals with superior
information to earn better returns.)
Information debiasing might be especially important in crime policy,
since many believe that a major impediment to the flow of information to police
and other decisionmakers is the high personal cost of disclosing information about
criminal activity.'18 Moreover, those with the most valuable information about
crime pattemns--cops walking the beat, criminals, and citizens sitting on their front
15.
MARKETS:

A

eds., 2006).
16.
17.
18.

Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets, in INFORMATION
126 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock

NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS
SUNSTEIN,

supra note 11, at 117.

See id at 35-36.
CLAYTON JAMES MOSHER ET AL., THE MISMEASURE OF
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porch-are those whose information and opinions are least likely to be heard in the
decision hierarchy.'19 In addition, the existence of multiple public safety agencies in
any jurisdiction complicates information flow in a way that increases the
likelihood of error.2
The second reason that prediction markets work is that they provide a
financial incentive to disclose information. Academics, neighbors, and public
safety officials may all have relevant information but may not have the incentive to
reveal it to officials because the personal costs (in terms of time, risk, etc.) may be
high, and the personal benefits may be low and shared with others. The collective
action and free rider problems, inherent in so many other areas of law and policy,
ring true here as well. Of course there will always be Good Samaritans, but
financial incentives, even nominal ones, have proven to be very effective at
eliciting information on the margin.2 Prediction markets have been successful
even when non-financial incentives are used, so long as the incentive is something
that the trader can use to distinguish himself from others.2
The third reason for prediction market success, closely related to the
financial incentive reason, is that markets allow forecasts to be weighted according
19.

Although aggregating dispersed infonnation might benefit many areas of

public policy decision-making, the case is easiest in crime rate forecasting. The fact that
information may be disproportionately located in individuals or places outside of the official
decision-making hierarchy is something that makes prediction markets especially useful in
crime rate and crime policy forecasting.
20.
Various barriers to information flow found in other highly complex
organizations also plague practical, on-the-job crime forecasting. Consider just some of the
various officials and agencies responsible for public safety in a city like Chicago: the
Chicago Police Department; the Illinois State Police; the Chicago Transit Authority Police;
the FBI; federal marshals; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Drug
Enforcement Agency; the Coast Guard; private security guards and police forces at
businesses, universities, and homes; police forces from neighboring towns and cities. Each
of these entities, not to mention their numerous agents, may have a different private agenda
or be prohibited from sharing information about future crime trends in a socially efficient
manner. For example, the FBI may learn through confidential informants about a rise in
gang activity in a city that is likely to increase homicide and burglary rates, but may not
share this with the appropriate local police force because of classic jurisdictional turf
battles, to protect the source of the information, for national security reasons, or due to
bureaucratic red tape. Or the information may be shared, but in a way that is not believable,
is too late to be useful, or with restrictions on how it can be used. In short, the problems that
inhibit information sharing among various intelligence agencies or among different
departments within a corporation are also evident in public safety enforcement given the

multiple jurisdictions and agendas at play. Markets are especially powerful in reducing
these types of transaction and coordination costs.
21.
See Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?,

14

ELECTRONIC MARKETs

243, 243 (2004) (concluding that "real-money markets may better

motivate information discovery while play-money markets may yield more efficient
information aggregation").
22.
In practice, firms use a variety of means, including rankings of points,
reputation, and lottery points that can be cashed in for trivial prizes. See SuNsTEiN, supra

note 11, at 117 (describing markets at Microsoft, Google, and other firms, using things like
lottery tickets for xbox game consoles).
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to conviction. Individuals with views about the future can not only offer their
opinion, but also express a confidence in their view by "putting their money where
their mouth is," scaling their wager based on their confidence level. An expert
willing to back a model of criminal behavior with a financial bet, even a nominal
one, is more believable than one that is not willing to make the bet. In addition, an
expert's $100 bet is, ceteris paribus, more reliable than her $1 bet on the same
issue.
The financial nexus between a tipster's information and his or her
confidence in the veracity of that information highlights the key distinction
between traditional crime prediction methods and crime prediction markets. While
deliberation or tip-based models of predicting crime tend to weight each opinion
based on the recipients' views of the veracity and quality of the information and its
provider, markets allow providers, who will often have better knowledge of these
things, the ability to give weight to their own contribution. This is especially
important if one believes, as the Authors do, that in the crime prediction business,
recipients are likely to be systematically biased or incapable of accurately
weighting information about future crime rates.
Fourth, and of particular interest in the area of prediction markets for
policy-making, these markets provide a centralized locus for information
aggregation. Today, for instance, if an expert criminologist at State University (or
even your Aunt Mary) has information that might be relevant to how many
burglaries there will be on Chicago's North Side next week, it is not obvious to
whom this information should be revealed or how it should be revealed. Of course
both the expert and the layperson can simply call the police with a tip, but the tip
will not carry much weight unless it gives authorities specific information about
past events or very likely future events. Further, police often dismiss tipsters as
crackpots. Police are also inundated with tips of all kinds-real, fake, and selfserving-and unsubstantiated hunches and complicated computer models are likely
to be lost in the noise of the station house.2 The expert might also try to get an
audience with, or send a report to, a politician, but the same problems of filtering,
and the official's workload exist here too. In addition, Aunt Mary, who might have
information of equal or better quality than the expert, is unlikely to get the
attention of key decisionmakers.
A public prediction market, however, solves these problems. Anyone with
information-whether big or small, based on concrete evidence or simply a
hunch--can go to a centralized virtual location on the Internet and place a
confidence-weighted bet on the future. Policymnakers enjoy a benefit too, since
they can look to one particular location (e.g., a web site) for all the information
germane to fuiture crime rates. In complex policy-making hierarchies that involve
numerous entities with multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, this is especially
valuable for top decisionmakers, such as the governor of a state. At present,
"Hunches" is not meant as a pejorative here, as they may be very valuable to
23.
the market. This is not only because they may contain valuable information, especially
when aggregated with other market participants, but also because individuals trading on
weak information add important liquidity to the market-they are the pollen that attracts the
bees.
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decisionmakers must rely solely on reports from advisors who may in turn be
relying on a variety of different estimates or models, each of which may be biased
in unknown ways. 24Prediction markets reduce the cacophony of forecasts to a
single estimate that the policymnaker can be sure represents the best available
forecast. The analogy here is to the stock price of a firm-although the CEO will
want to know more about the business she runs than just the stock price, this
simple "price" allows her to quickly gauge the collective wisdom of the market.
Rarely will the CEO take action solely because the stock price moves, but a move
25
may spurn action and investigation. We envision the same dynamic here.
Finally, markets provide instantaneous and continuous feedback to
information providers through prices. This does two things. First, the price (and
hence forecast) can change continuously, giving policymakers; an always
up-to-date assessment of future crime trends-much as the stock market gives
economic policymnakers a continuously updated assessment of the health of the
economy. Second, it gives traders information about the beliefs of other traders,
thereby giving them an added incentive to collect and analyze information. For
example, if a criminologist sees that the market price forecast anticipates that
crime will fall next year in Chicago, but her model shows that a sharp increase is
expected, she has a financial incentive to buy (sell) contracts paying off if there is
a rise (fall) in crime next year in Chicago. If she does this heavily, thereby causing
a change in prices, but then sees the market prices return to prior levels, she might
revisit the assumptions in her model or search out what additional information
might explain the rest of the market's view. This feature is unique to markets, and
is a main reason why markets give better estimates than estimates based on
consensus or averages of one-off expert opinions.
B. Extant Markets
Given the theoretical basis and the results described above, it is probably
unsurprising that prediction markets have increasingly been adapted to a range of
forecasting tasks. The most prominent example is the Iowa Electronic Markets,
which has predicted the result of elections more accurately than opinion polls or

24.
This problem is bound to be especially salient in crime policy. For one, the
current collectors of information about crime-the police, police unions, and police
management-may have incentives to manipulate data in a way that serves private over
public uses. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 18, at 34. For example, police may have
incentives to play up the amount of crime in an area in order to attract more resources there
or to play up the amount of arrests to show how well they are doing their job. The false data
may then be used as inputs to official resource allocation decisions. In addition, given the
multiple jurisdictions covering any geographic area, as well as the various public safety
agencies in each of these jurisdictions, routing information in an efficient manner is a
tremendously difficult task. This is similar to the problem faced by various intelligence
agencies after 9/11, which the federal government has been trying to solve with great
difficulty. With federal, state, and local law enforcement, each of which has multiple
subdivisions, operating within any city or town, the problems of information flow and
coordination are bound to be similar in scope.
25.
See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1361-64.
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any other available means.2 In this forecasting area and others, the academic
markets have been joined more recently by for-profit exchanges like Intrade and
Betfair. 2 7 Businesses are also experimenting with these markets, primarily for
forecasting sales, input costs, project completion dates, threat of rival products,
and potential litigation.2 8 Some prediction markets, like those for weather and
macroeconomic data (such as the Consumer Price Index) outperform point
estimates of experts or consensus averages of experts. For example, Refet
Gtirkaynak and Justin Wolfers found that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
Economic Derivatives (Merc) markets yielded more accurate forecasts than the
usual "consensus forecast" obtained by averaging the forecasts of a panel of
experts .29 Building on this success, institutional market makers, like the Merc, now
host "prediction markets" on topics ranging from the number of days it will frost in
a particular month to the number of housing starts in a particular geographical
area. 3 0 It seems inevitable that these markets would eventually find their way from
serving as inputs for private actors to data for government policymnakers.
Although the federal government's first foray into deploying prediction
markets to aid policy analysis-the DARPA-funded terrorism market-was
torpedoed for political reasons,3 prediction markets have recently begun to be

proposed and used by academics for informing public

policy.
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Many issues of

public policy seem to be driven by randomness, so that while large amounts of
data are collected and analyzed by centralized authorities, it is likely that
government officials' decisions fail to fully take into account the results of this
26.

See Joyce Berg et at., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures

Markets Research, in Ti-taHANDBOOK

OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS

742 (Charles

R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2003).
27.
Intrade, for example, runs prediction markets on current events, financial
topics, politics, and the weather. Intrade: The Prediction Market, www.intrade.com (last
visited Jan. 31, 2010). Betfair is similar. Betfair, www.betfair.com (last visited Jan. 31,
2010).
See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1349-50 (describing early
28.
experiments with markets at Hewlett Packard and Siemens, and giving numerous examples
of corporate innovators). Within the business sector, technology firms have been
particularly quick to adopt prediction markets, and firms such as Electronic Arts, Google,
Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, and Siemens have used internal markets to forecast futures
sales, whether projects will be completed on time, or the success of unreleased products by
both the firms and their competitors. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 117.
Refet S. Giirkaynak & Justin Wolfers, Macroeconomic Derivatives: An
29.
Initial Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty and Risk, in NBER
INTERNATIONAL

SEMINAR ON MACROECONOMICS

2005, at 1112 (Jeffrey Frankel &

Christopher Pissarides eds., 2007).
See CME Group, http://www.cmegroup.com/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
30.
See, e.g., Robert Looney, DARPA 's Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence:
31.

Outside the Box or Off the

Wall?, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS,

Sept. 2003, available at

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJoumna1/2003/septO3/terroris
m.html.
See MICHAEL ABR.AMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
32.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING 34-64

(2007); see also Andrew Leigh et al., What

Do Financial Markets Think of War in Iraq? (Stanford Graduate School of Business
Research Paper No. 1785, 2003), available at http://ssmn.com/abstract--388762.
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analysis. A significant barrier to the implementation of more analytically based
policies is the time lag inherent in the process of data collection and
analysis-meaning that public officials are frequently presented with information
that is significantly out of date. In contrast, market prices are immediate and
transparent, and would reduce processing costs, including time.
Consider the flu. The influenza virus kills roughly 36,000 Americans each
year,3 and between $3 and $5 billion is spent each year on prevention, vaccines,
34
diagnosis, and treatment of flu, not to mention lost productivity and other costs.
Isolated influenza outbreaks can rapidly morph into epidemics, and thus it is vital
for public health officials to have the most complete and up-to-date information
available. They do not.3 5 The incentives are very high for individuals with
information about flu trends to make predictions, but until recently the only
forecasting being done, if any, was that of individual doctors or policymakers
based on raw, historical data collected and distributed (with a time lag) by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC). The information about future disease activity
exists, but according to experts in epidemiology, it is difficult to collect and
analyze since it is dispersed and much activity appears to be random.
Accordingly, the University of Iowa, which pioneered prediction markets
for political elections, developed and began to operate a flu prediction market.
Every Friday during the height of flu season, the CDC publishes a map of the
United States, color-coded with five colors to reflect the (recent) historical
prevalence of the flu virus in each state, with yellow coding for no activity, green
for sporadic activity, purple for local concentrations, blue for regional activity and
red for widespread activity.3 The Iowa Flu market is based on the outcome of this
map, with medical professionals across the state buying and selling contracts
electronically, attempting to successfully predict what color the state of Iowa will
be on the map for any given week. At the end of the influenza season, each trader
receives an educational grant equal to the U.S. dollar equivalent of the balance of
"Iowa Flu Dollars" remaining in their account. Researchers at the University of
Iowa believe that by aggregating the knowledge of medical professionals who see
infection taking place on the ground level, they can predict changes in infection
levels more efficiently and accurately than government analysts can.
Results from the use of prediction markets to forecast influenza levels are
extremely promising.3 The markets proved more accurate than other methods of
prediction based on historical influenza levels for up to four weeks in advance of
the target week. Indeed, on average, two weeks in advance of the target week, 50%
33.
Nat'l
Inst.
of
Allergy
&
Infectious
Diseases,
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
34.
Stephen C. Schoenbaum, Economic Impact of Influenza: The Individual's
Perspective, 82 Am. J.MED. (Supp. 6A) 26,26-27 (1987).
35.
Flu data, which is collected and disseminated by the CDC, is available with
at least a one-week lag. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Seasonal Influenza,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
36.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Weekly US Map: Influenza
Summary Update, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/usmap.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
37.
See Philip M. Polgreen et al., Use of Prediction Markets to Forecast

Infectious DiseaseActivity, 44 CLINICAL
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of observations predicted the correct color, and 100% of observations were one
color or less away from the correct prediction level. 38 As one would expect,
forecasts improved closer to the relevant measurement period: one week before,
the markets predicted the correct color about 70% of the time on average.3 9 These
results are far superior to any other mechanism used anywhere by anyone.4
These flu-forecasting experiments provide a useful analogy for
considering crime-forecasting prediction markets. In both domains, the
information necessary to set up a useful real-time surveillance and data-gathering
system exists, with the key difficulty being how to extract and aggregate the
information being seen by individuals (doctors or police) in the field. Standard
data collection systems exist, but tend to be backward-looking rather than
forward-looking, thereby limiting their usefulness for policy purposes. The
challenges of setting up prediction markets are also likely to be similar in each
domain, as the idea of trading in markets is somewhat foreign to both healthcare
professionals and those in the law enforcement community. Yet in both cases, the
gains of more accurate and timely forecasts may be substantial .4 1 Before turning to
how prediction market data can be used to informn policy-making, we will set the
stage by describing the current methods used by policymakers.
C. Current Methods of Crime Forecasting
Crime predictions occur, as they must, within every public safety agency
at every level of government. Every agency from the local sheriffs office to the
FBI must make forecasts about how much crime and how much of each particular
crime is likely to occur in the future. These forecasts help officials determine the
amount of crime-fighting resources needed and how to allocate them across the
jurisdiction. Our review of current practices reveals that there is an abundance of
tools and methods for forecasting, but that these are rarely, if ever, used. And, in
any event, they are unlikely to be as effective as those we suggest in this Article.
1. Academic Models
In their book Is Crime Predictable?, Carolyn Block and Sheryl Knight
attempt to predict future trends in specific types of crime based on data gathered
from past criminal activity taking place in the Chicago area.4 The predictive
accuracy of their model varied widely depending on the type of crime in question.
For example, rates of larceny and theft were by far the most predictable, with the
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See id.
See id.

41.

It could be argued that this analogy is inapt because viruses are easier to

track than the behavior of criminals. While not perfect, it is nevertheless valuable. For one,
most existing criminal law forecasting models use inputs like weather, proximity to other
crimes, and other crude variables that have reasonable analogs in medical models of
infection. In addition, the problem of forecasting is one in which highly localized, private
information is dispersed and not currently centralized.
CARoLiNE REBECCA BLOCK & SH-ERYL L. KNIGHT, ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
42.
INFO.

AUTH.,

Is

CRIME

PREDICTABLE?

(1987),

available

http://www.icjia.org/public/pdf/ResearchReports/Is%/2OCrime%/2OPredictable.pdf.
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number of offenses in eleven cities predicted within 10% for the year 1982. In
contrast, there were accurate predictions of burglary in only three out of the
fourteen cities studied, and predictive success for aggravated assault varied widely,
from very accurate predictions to completely unpredictable, depending on the city
in question.4 Ultimately, the authors concluded that the success of their
predictions was highly dependent on the quantity of accurate crime data available
for crime in a given jurisdiction,4
Perhaps the most successful experiment to date is from a study in Britain
that re-ran history to predict crimes in the past using new models. Unlike area
characteristic studies, the authors based their work purely on the notion that certain
crimes, namely burglary, are more likely to be communicable-that is, to occur in
neighboring areas over short periods. In this experiment, Kate Bowers, Shane
Johnson, and Ken Pease compared three methods for predicting burglaries in and
around Liverpool, England.4
The first, called "beat hot spotting," is commonly used by police forces
around the world. "Beat hot spotting" plots locations of crimes over a certain
period of time (say, the past two months) on maps showing the boundaries of
different police beats or precincts. The "hot spots" are the locations with the
highest concentration of recent crimes, and thus justify more force and attention.
The second, called "retrospective hot spotting," is the most widely

accepted method among academic criminologists. 46 "Retrospective hot spotting"
involves plotting crimes on an area map, and then applying certain statistical
techniques to estimate the density of risk over a specified area (in this case, 200
meters), based on the theory that crimes are more likely inside that area and less
likely outside of it.
The final technique, "prospective hot spotting," differs only from
retrospective hot spotting in that it weights crimes by time. By assigning weights
to crimes based on when they occurred, the prospective hot spotting technique
accounts for the fact that crimes (especially burglary, which was the focus of the
authors' study) tend to be highly localized in time and space, and are thus
"communicable."4 In this light, the prospective method is far superior to other
existing tools, at least for burglary.
The authors show the predictive ability of this approach by re-running
history using historical data. They found that had their approach been used, they
would have predicted 62% of burglaries within two days, compared with 46% for
the retrospective technique, and only 12% for the beat technique.
43.
44.

See id.
See id.

Kate J. Bowers et al., The Future of Crime Mapping?, 44 BRIT. J.
641 (2004).
46.
See Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Aoristic Analysis: The Spatial Interpretation of
Unspecific Temporal Events, 14 INT'L J. GEOGRAPHIC INFO. Sci. 669 (2000) (discussing the
general concept of using past events to generate maps of crime hot spots).
47.
The authors show that "the risk of victimization increase[s] for houses within
400 metres of a burgled household for a period of around one to two months, and especially
on the same side of the street ... "Bowers et al., supra note 45, at 643.
45.

CRIMINOLOGY
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Despite these robust findings, we know of no police force that actively
uses this modeling approach. In addition, this particular model is limited to one
particular type of crime and on a micro scale. It is also just one data point, and
while it may be useful when aggregated with other perspectives, on its own it may
yield biased estimates due to manipulation, user error, or other factors. For
example, burglars might adapt their behavior to foil the model. Therefore, the
possibility of using this or other techniques as inputs to a market-based assessment
would provide a superior approach while leveraging the strengths of this
technique.
2. Real- World Applications

The general idea of using crime-mapping tools has been used by some
police forces in large cities to help allocate resources. Perhaps most prominently,
New York City has deployed a crime mapping system, known as "CompStat," to
assist in resource allocation, strategy formulation, and tactical analysis .48 Although
it is a management philosophy rather than a theoretical, computer-based model,
CompStat uses crime data and computer mapping systems as inputs. The basic
idea is to use so-called "Geographic Information Systems" to map in real time the
location and details of crimes that occur. Decisionmakers can then populate crime
maps with demographic data, locations of points of interest-like police stations,
schools, and bars-as well as any other information that users consider relevant to
crime prediction.4
The process of forecasting and evaluation in this context is less technical
than managerial, as its use by the New York Police Department (NYPD) and
departments in other cities"0 is primarily about framing data and issues for analysis
and discussion, instead of creating formulaic and computer analysis of data. The
NYPD describes the program as follows:
On a weekly basis, personnel from each of the Department's 76
Precincts, 9 Police Service Areas and 12 Transit Districts compile a
statistical summary of the week's crime complaint, arrest and
summons activity, as well as a written recapitulation of significant
48.
For a detailed discussion of New York City's approach and its critics, see
Heather MacDonald, "Compstat and Its Enemies," City Journal, Feb. 17, 2010, availableat
http://www.city-joumnal.org/2010/eonO2l7hm.html. For a study critical of the approach, see
Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango, & Eric Baumer, Did Ceasefire, CampStat, and Exile
Reduce
Homicide?,
available
at
http://www.cjgsu.net/initiatives/CPP /2043%20Rosenfeld.pdf.
49.
The theoretical underpinnings are based on work in environmental
criminology, see, e.g., ENviRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L.
Brantingham eds., 1981), and routine activity theory, see Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus
Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, 44 Am. Soc.
REv. 588 (1979).
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Angeles, Philadelphia, and
Dep't,
CompStat,

http://www.lapdonline.orgcrime-mapsand-Compstatcontent-basi-view/6363
(last
visited
Feb.
28,
20 10);
Phila.
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Dep't,
CompStat
Process,
http://www.ppdonline.org/hqcompstat.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); Chi. Police Dep't,
ClearMap, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 20 10).
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cases, crime patterns and police activities. This data, which includes
the specific times and locations at which the crimes and
enforcement activities took place, is forwarded to the Chief of
Department's CompStat Unit where it is collated and loaded into a
city-wide database. The data is analyzed by computer and a weekly
CompStat Report is generated. The CompStat Report captures crime
complaint and arrest activity at the precinct, patrol borough, and
city-wide levels, and presents a concise summary of these and other
important performance indicators. These data are presented on a
week-to-date, prior 30 days, and year-to-date basis with
comparisons to previous years' activity. Precinct commanders and
members of the agency's top management can easily discern
emerging and established crime trends as well as deviations and
anomalies, and can easily make comparisons between commands.
5
Each precinct is also ranked in each complaint and arrest category. '
In other words, the system is used as a template to facilitate discussions between
local officers and more senior department leadership-it gives some facts to
support gut-based decision-making.
Accordingly, the process is extremely localized and subject to the
idiosyncrasies and biases of the individuals involved. There are no universal
formulas, no standards for evaluating crime statistics, and no guarantee that the
forecasts will be free from the biases of whatever local decisionmakers think is
relevant. Although we are not aware of any systematic data on the success of these
mapping systems, their usefuilness is limited by the shortcomings of any
non-market-based analysis described above. To recapitulate briefly, in this context
there are many available mapping systems and models, with no clear best version,
let alone a formula for applying the tools in a successful way. The federal
government has invested some resources to try and overcome barriers to
implementing existing forecasting tools. The most obvious use of this investment
is a series of conferences at which academics and public safety officials share
data.5 The bounty of these conferences is promising but reinforces our earlier
51.

For

a detailed

discussion

of New

York

City's

approach,

see

http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/chfdept/compstat-process.html.
52.
For example, the National Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology
Center was founded in 1994 as part of the National Institute of Justice with the mission of
providing "support, research findings, and technological expertise to help State and local
law enforcement and corrections personnel perform their duties more safely and
efficiently."
See
Justice
Technology
Info.
Network,
http://www.justnet.org/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). The Center's Crime
Mapping & Analysis Program provides technical assistance and training "in the areas of
crime and intelligence analysis and geographic information systems." See Nat'l Inst. of
Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). It allows crime
analysts, who might work in civilian agencies or be uniformed officers, access to shared
knowledge and resources about the "best" available means of forecasting crime. There are
also some crime analyst trade associations that provide support. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of
Crime Analysts, http://www.iaca.net (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); Bair Software - Our
Company, http://www.bairsoftware.com/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). There
are also free web sites that offer both advice and some rudimentary mapping tools. For
example, www.crimereports.com is a "national crime mapping and citizen alerting site, free
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observation about the usefulness of markets as an aggregating tool in a world in
which there are numerous available tools but no best tool. There are innumerable
sources of 54information, 5 3 but it is clear that the information is not being
aggregated.5 It also shows the challenge that any decisioninaker must face when
thinking about crime forecasting-there are perhaps too many choices and options
without sufficient data or experience to indicate the optimal strategy. 5
Despite the significant research on the subject in the past fifty years, no
widely accepted method for predicting criminal activity has emerged. As with
influenza statistics, it is still a formidable task to publish information that is timely,
accurate, and in a format that can be understood and used by law enforcement
personnel working on the ground level. Indeed, because the task of transforming
much of criminological research from an academic exercise to actionable
information presents a difficult obstacle, many decisions taken by professionals
seem to be based on "gu instinct" rather than fact-based analysis.

for any law enforcement agency nationwide." In addition, there are numerous conferences
where academics and law enforcement officials interact to discuss new tools and techniques.
The "Ninth Crime Mapping Research Conference" was held in 2007. At this conference,
experts from universities presented new software tools.
53.
Another source of data and analysis is the National Insurance Crime Bureau
(NICB). The NCIB is a private trade group of over 1000 insurance companies that has
investigators and analysts who try to identify crime patterns and hot spots relevant to the
insurance of life and property. As far as we are aware, the NCIB and other similar groups do
not share their information, models, or analyses in any systematic fashion with public safety
officials or other analysts. We speculate that there are many other private entities like NCIB
doing similar research that would be useful inputs to prediction markets on crime rates. This
is just another example of how information that might be valuable to policymnakers is
dispersed and siloed in inefficient ways.
54.
A variety of public-facing tools for citizens and policymakers are also
available through web-based mapping programs. There are websites where anyone can
access crime statistics on neighborhood maps for cities including Chicago, San Francisco,
Indianapolis, and Philadelphia. For example, on www.chicagocrime.org, citizens can type in
a street address, and immediately see the location and details of crimes committed in the
vicinity over specified time periods. These websites suggest several interesting conclusions.
For one, there already exists a lot of freely available and up-to-date data on crimes that have
been committed. The problem does not seem to be a lack of data but a lack of useful
analysis. These data and websites can be useful for the markets we envision because they
are inputs and data that anyone from experts to citizens can use to inform their trades. These
websites also show that there is a demand for these data among the general public, who will
be vital to creating a liquid market that will produce interesting results. Numerous providers
are available, but not all of them have complete data or coverage. For example, one of the
authors tried to use one site to collect information on crime in his neighborhood, and got an
error message saying that the local police department did not provide data to the site.
Finally, all of these sites, like most of the crime analysis being done in law enforcement
agencies, are backward looking. A citizen of Chicago, Philadelphia, or New Hampshire can
find out (maybe) what crimes were committed in these places, but not the most up-to-date
thinking on what crime is likely to happen soon or in the future.
55.
Prediction markets may make these conferences less necessary because the
knowledge of crime experts can be shared and aggregated electronically instead of in
person.
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With this abundance of data and analytical shortcomings as background,
we turn to our contribution to this field.

11. PREDICTION MARKET FORECASTS FOR CRIME
AND CRIME POLICY
A. Crime Forecasting Basics
Crime forecasting research has been largely academic and consists almost
entirely of mapping and modeling historical data to geographical areas,
demographics, and external factors, such as weather or time of day. Although these
point estimate models are undoubtedly useful, they are, for the reasons discussed
in the previous part, of only very limited use. Moreover, we are aware of no crime
prevention authorities using such tools to make predictions either about (1)
localized crime trends (for example, what the crime rate will be in a particular area
of the city in the next two weeks) or (2) longer-term crime trends (for example,
what the crime rate will be in a state over the next decade). To our knowledge,
crime policy setters, such as governors, attorneys general, and mayors, are not
using these models either.
Very simple markets can be designed for both purposes, and their output
is likely to be much simpler to comprehend and much more accurate than any
existing models or practices. For instance, imagine that a policymaker-say one
setting sentencing policy or allocating budgets for future prosecutorial and prison
functions-wants to determine the best estimate of the violent crime rate in a
particular geographical area for a future year. The policymaker could offer a
contract that pays $1 if the violent crime rate for the year in question is between
twenty and twenty-five victimnizations per thousand people (and $0 otherwise).5
The market could also include other potential ranges, such as ten to fifteen, fifteen
to twenty, twenty-five to thirty, and thirty-five to forty, and so on, with similar
payoffs. Specifying the entire range of probable outcomes has the advantage that
the market not only reveals an expected future crime rate but also a complete
probability distribution. This would allow the policymnaker to determine the most
likely outcome and level of uncertainty of the forecast, and to give appropriate
weight to both upside and downside risks.
Individuals with information, a guess, or an intuition about the crime rate
would then trade based on their views about the relative value of the contract and
its current trading price. For example, if an academic criminologist who has built
an econometric model estimating a violent crime rate in Illinois of thirty to thirtyfive victimizations per thousand residents sees that the price of a contract for this
prediction is trading at $0.45 (meaning that the market believes that this crime rate
is about 45% likely to oc cur), she may buy these contracts until the price reaches
her confidence level in the model. On the other side of the transaction may be a
police chief in Chicago who has seen crime levels in historically high-crime areas
falling dramatically, and who believes this to be a secular trend. He may sell (or
sell short) contracts for the thirty to thirty-five range, while simultaneously buying
56.

Since the bet is effectively $1 or $0, these contracts are called "binary

options."
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contracts in the ten to fifteen range, which is what his gut tells him is the right
answer. 5 7 Trades like these, and innumerable and uncharacterizable others, will
take place while the market remains open, allowing not only an aggregation of
various estimates but also a feedback mechanism that allows continual updating.
As noted above, the evidence from other forecasting domains suggests that this
mechanism will likely yield superior forecasts to other alternatives.
Not only are the prediction market estimates an improvement in terms of
forecasting, they also add a useful probability dimension to any forecast. As noted
above, using a range of potential future outcomes as contract reference points not
only allows policymnakers to assess the most likely outcome, but also permits
policymakers to estimate the most likely range of outcomes, as well as the relative
weight of risk from higher or lower results than the mean expected result.
Work by Refet GUrkaynak and Justin Wolfers illustrates an analogous
example from the economic forecasting domain, specifically expected job growth.
Figure 1 shows the price of various securities that would pay $1 if employment
growth in May 2005 fell into specified ranges. The graph shows that traders were
willing to pay $0.11 7 for the option paying $1 if payroll growth was between
100,000 and 125,000 jobs. This implies a market probability of about 11.7% for
this result. This distribution suggested that 174,600 jobs were expected to be added
to non-farm payrolls, but that there was significant uncertainty around this
estimate, with a 95% confidence interval extending from 0 to 3 50,000 jobs.

57.
Two things about this stylized example, where there are traders on both sides
of a particular transaction, are worth exploring. First, in these markets traders are typically
anonymous, so that no individual knows with whom he or she is trading. It is possible that
some markets could be designed to reveal the identity of the traders, since this might have
signaling benefits. These issues have been discussed elsewhere in a related context. See
Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1349-50. Second, the example assumes an
open-auction style market, in which buyers and sellers are matched by a market maker
(usually an automated computer system), but there are many other potential market designs.
See generally id at 1350-54. For example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Goldman
Sachs, and Deutsche Bank, and others have set up new markets in "economic derivatives,"
which are designed to predict macroeconomic data like the number of jobs created or the
number of housing starts in which alternative market structures are used. One of the most
common is the pari-mutuel system in which individual bets are aggregated without having a
seller or buyer on the other side. See id.; see also Gtirkaynak & Wolfers, supra note 29, at
14.
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Figure 1:
Auction on Non-Farm Payrolls for May 2005
Held June 3, 2005
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B. Simple Crime Forecasting
Applying the general tools described above to crime forecasting is a
logical next step given the importance of this issue and the lack of an accepted
methodology for making predictions today. In many of the other areas mentioned
above-including interest rates, product sales, weather, and political
elections-prediction markets serve as an aggregator of different expert opinions
and methodologies, a mechanism for improving deliberation among experts, and a
sanity check on expert views. Crime prediction is at a more basic stage, as there
are no consensus estimates from experts as to what the crime rate will be in some
future period. Expert opinions are diffuse, untested, and remote from
policymnakers. In addition, crime prediction is an area where localized knowledge
by laypersons can provide real value to the market, unlike, say, interest rates. We
will leave a description of the specifics of the policy process to others, and will
discuss only those issues that are particularly relevant when considering the role of
market-generated forecasts.
I. Forecastingthe Past
For simplicity, we begin by noting one very simple (but potentially
useful) role for prediction markets: they can be used to "forecast" history. Crime
analysts are often forced to wait for months before official crime statistics are
released, and this is often too late for them to be relevant for analysis or
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forecasting. For example, the FBI publishes an annual report-Crime in the United
States-that aggregates data from nearly 17,000 law enforcement agencies.518 This
report tells us, for instance, that there were 25,314 burglaries in the City of
Chicago in 2005 .59 The report for 2006 was not issued until September 2007,
however, making the data less useful for policymnakers at the national or local level
than it would be if real-time data or estimates were available. A quicker release of
the data (or forecast thereof) would allow some decisions for the current or next
year to be made based on the most recent experiences in a city or state. Thus, a
prediction market forecasting what the FBI or Bureau of Justice Statistics will
eventually publish as last year's crime rate can provide a very useful interim
estimate.6
2. Simple Forecasts of the Future and the Feedback Loop
A more ambitious program might involve the use of a forward-looking
prediction market for informing resource allocation decisions. Assuming that the
maximand for policymnakers is crime reduction, and the only short-term lever for
implementation is the number of police officers to allocate to a particular area,
officials may allocate greater or fewer numbers of police officers to a particular
area based on the market's predictions. For instance, if a market of experts,
political leaders, law enforcement agents, and local citizens believe that crime is
expected to rise in the north of a city, but not in the center, this might suggest reallocating police to the north. This behavior would be consistent with
policymnakers' objectives and-assuming market predictions are accurate-would
presumably lower crime in that particular area.
But, this approach is not without difficulties. Traders will understand that
a higher price of contracts predicting high crime levels in the north will lead to a
police response, which may lead to lower crime in that area than would be
predicted, and therefore cause traders to lower their forecasts of crime in the north.
This is the feedback loop problem.
The extent of this feedback loop depends on the perceived responsiveness
of policymnakers. If policing levels are thought to be entirely unresponsive to
forecasts, then there is no feedback at all. At the other extreme is market
equilibrium. If policing levels respond sufficiently to prediction market prices,
then market participants understand that policymnakers are working to ensure that
no area sees disproportionately high crime, and hence the market will predict equal
58.
See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (last
visited Jan. 3 1, 20 10).
59.
See FBI, Offenses Known to Law Enforcement: Illinois 2005,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_-08 -il.htmnl (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
60.
Similarly, prediction markets could be used to forecast future data revisions
by the official agencies. There is evidence in some contexts that the market is quite good at
incorporating forecasts of future revisions into market prices. For example, Alan Krueger
and Kenneth Fortson show that while financial markets respond strongly to new
employment data, they do not respond to revisions to previously released data, suggesting
that markets had already forecast these revisions. See Alan B. Krueger & Kenneth N.
Fortson, Do Markets Respond More to More Reliable Labor Market Data? A Test of Market
Rationality, 1 J. EuR. EcoN. Ass'N 931(2003).
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crime rates in all areas of the city-regardless of the presence or absence of factors
that influence crime. Intermediate cases between these extreme assumptions will
yield intermediate predictions, and the variance in forecasts will be attenuated by
the possibility of a partial response in policing levels. To be clear, the problem
here is not in the quality of the forecasts-and in the examples considered above,
the market may well yield accurate forecasts, both in terms of being unbiased and
in terms of statistical accuracy. Rather, the subtle issue considered here relates to
61
how forecasts might serve as an input to the policy process.
A first-cut solution to this problem would be to run a forecast based on a
"no policy change" scenario. For example, a prediction market could be set up that
forecasts the burglary rate in the north, south, and city center in some future period
assuming that current policing decisions (for example, the number of police
assigned to each precinct and the number of patrols) were to persist within some
specified tolerance range. This could be implemented by trading contracts tied to
future crime levels, but with the proviso that all bets are cancelled if policing
levels changed. Such a market would in fact reveal the market's expectation of
crime levels in the future period, conditional on current policing levels persisting
until that fuiture period.
This solution, however, raises a further set of difficulties, as traders might
ask what circumstances would lead policymnakers to keep policing allocations
unchanged. Presumably current policing patterns are likely to persist only if
current crime patterns also persist over the relevant time period. In this way, while
the market will in fact forecast precisely what was asked of it--certain crime rates
conditional on current policing patterns persisting-this forecast reveals a
confluence of underlying crime factors and the policy reaction function.6 The
result is a feedback loop that may make it difficult to interpret prediction market
prices. After all, changes in underlying crime factors will have both a direct effect
61.
Indeed, this difficulty is not unique to prediction markets, as all forecasts
must be based upon some assumption about the future of the policy variables (in this
example, the policy variables are policing levels by district). In the example considered
above, the prediction market prices forecast the expected levels of crime across space,
taking account of the "policy reaction function"7-the expected response of policymakers to
this forecast. Thus, these forecasts incorporate forecasts of both underlying crime factors,
and the responsiveness of policymnakers.
62.
The difficulty here is quite familiar in the economic context; as forecasts of
interest rates by both bond markets and professionals reflect the convolution of underlying
economic forces and also the expected response of the Federal Reserve to these shocks. As
Greg Mankiw recently wrote:
This might seem circular: The Fed is responding to the market, and the
market is responding to the Fed. But there is nothing wrong with that.
Economists are used to simultaneity. Of course, the market will catch on
to the policy, but that's okay. In fact, it is ideal. We end up in a

fixed-point equilibrium in which the market expects the Fed will hit its
inflation target. In this equilibrium, the market's forecast of interest rates
will tell the Fed what it needs to do to accomplish what it wants to
accomplish,

Greg Mankiw, How to Decentralize Monetary Policy, GREG MANK~w's

BLOG, July

2006, http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/07/how-to-decentralize-monetary-policy.html.
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(raising the forecast level of crime) and a partly offsetting indirect effect (as
traders in prediction markets respond to the likelihood that policymakers will
respond to this shock, thereby lessening its influence).
The possibility that crime forecasts are joint forecasts of crime factors and
policy responses, however, is not fatal to the enterprise of using market-based or
other forecasts for policy purposes. There is a simple way of resolving the
feedback loop or simultaneity problem.
To see this, consider the case in which the crime rate in a jurisdiction is a
function of the underlying level of criminality and the policy response from public
safety officials. In a world with robust crime rate prediction markets, we would
expect policymakers to set a policy response based on two imperfect forecasts of
the underlying level of crime: a traditional forecast model and the forecast from
the prediction market. But the prediction market is not predicting underlying levels
of criminality but rather crime rates, which are influenced by the expected policy
response, which is in tum influenced by the prediction market price.
This again is the feedback loop problem. The prediction market price is
based on an estimate of crime rate conditional on an estimated level of underlying
criminality, but that crime rate includes a policy response to the very prediction
market price that is being generated. As shown mathematically in the Appendix,
we can solve this series of simultaneous equations for the relationship between the
prediction market price and underlying crime factors so that we can resolve the
feedback loop.
Rather than slog through the math here, we simply summarize the key
implications of the model and relegate the details to the Appendix. First, if
policymakers respond to the traditional, non-market forecast, the response of the
prediction market forecast to a rise in underlying crime is muted by the expected
response of policy to offset this expected rise in crime. If the policy fully offsets
any shocks to underlying criminality, then the crime rate will not be revealing of
shocks to the underlying crime factor, and hence the prediction market price
provides no information about the underlying crime factor. In the more realistic
case in which shocks are less than fully offset, the model shows that the prediction
market price provides useful, albeit attenuated assessments of levels of underlying
criminality.
Second, if policymnakers respond (somewhat) to the prediction market
prices, responses to rises in crime will be further attenuated. But an important
output of this model is that as long as the policymaker does not respond infinitely
strongly to prediction market prices, there will still be a positive (albeit attenuated)
relationship between the prediction market price and the underlying crime factor.
This means that prediction market prices are still valuable for policymnakers, even
when policy reacts aggressively to underlying crime factors.
From this simple model, we can take away the following. Prediction
market prices will respond to changes in the underlying criminality or crime
factors, but not one-for-one. This is because: (1) prediction market participants
don't have perfect foresight; (2) policymakers respond to rises in a certain
underlying crime factor (X) as forecast by the traditional approach, and this
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reduces the effect of X on the ultimate crime rates; (3) policymnakers respond to the
prediction market, fuirther reducing the effect of expected rises in crime factors on
crime rate; and (4) prediction market participants understand all of this. Thus, if
policy responds to forecasts of crime, this will tend to attenuate the extent to which
prediction market prices reflect changes in the underlying crime factor.
To return to our concrete example, if some underlying crime factor is
expected to lead burglary in the north of the city to rise by 10%, markets may
expect the policymnaker to respond by sufficiently raising the police presence to
partly offset this risk. As such, the prediction market may only suggest that the
number of burglaries in the north of the city will be higher by 3%. This means that
the market believes that the policy response will, on average, reduce the number of
burglaries that would be expected if police policy persisted, but not by an amount
sufficient to keep the number of burglaries unchanged. When reading the market
data, policymnakers should be aware of this feedback loop, and should respond to
this forecast of a 3% higher burglary rate as if it is forecasting a 10% higher
burglary rate, and respond accordingly. If the policymnaker responds to the degree
anticipated, then the number of burglaries will rise by only 3%, despite the fact
that underlying factors shifted enough to raise burglaries by 10%. As long as the
market knows with some certainty the likely reaction of policymnakers, this can
lead the market to an efficient estimate of crime rates, since traders can incorporate
the reaction into their forecasts, and policymnakers can unpack forecasts and
expected policy responses when setting policy.
To be more concrete, suppose that the Chicago Police Department has,
through the Mayor's office, a long-term target for the burglary rate, and announces
(or simply follows) a policy of allocating police resources in a specific and set
manner. For example, if the market expects the burglary rate to be higher than the
target, allocate more resources than the market expects; if the market expects the
burglary rate to be lower than the target, allocate fewer resources than the market
expects. The result is an equilibrium in which market forecasts help to inform
policymakers about appropriate resource allocations.
C. Using Markets to Inform Policy
The most important questions for crime policy-ones that the simple
prediction markets discussed above are not designed to address-involve the
efficacy of different types of crime-reduction interventions. The policy-relevant
questions include whether to devote greater resources to police on the street, or to
incarceration; whether to focus efforts on social programs, or on developing a
robust low-wage labor market; and the relative cost and benefits of curfews, antigang efforts, or the death penalty. These questions are about identifying the causal
effect of various interventions.
There are two ways in which prediction markets can be helpfuil in
identifying these important structural parameters. The first we call a prediction
63
market event study; the second involves contingentprediction markets.

63.
See Joel Slemrod & Timothy Greimel, Did Steve Forbes Scare the US
Municipal Bond Market?, 74 J. Pun3. EcoN. 81, 81 (1999) (examining impact of Forbes's
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1. PredictionMarket Event Studies

The term "event study" comes from finance, where it is a tool commonly
used to determine the causal significance of a particular event-like a press
release-on a firm's stock price. These studies are premised on the idea that the
price of a stock reflects an informed forward-looking assessment of the company's
prospects. So, for instance, if a firm decides to purchase a competitor and the
announcement of this decision is accompanied by an increase in the firm's stock
price, it is likely that the market believes that the acquisition will raise the firm's
profits. An event study can be used to isolate the effect of the announcement from
other influences on the firm's stock price.
By analogy, the "price" in a crime prediction market reflects an informed
forward-looking assessment of the rate of a particular criminal activity. As
discussed above, a prediction market designed to predict the number of homicides
in Illinois in the next year will generate a market price for contracts paying $1 for
each potential outcome. This price represents the market-based probability of that
particular outcome. Given this market, one could perform a prediction-market
event study looking to see if the announcement of, say, a death penalty moratorium
led the market to forecast higher or lower homicide rates. 6
It is worth comparing the event study methodology with a more
traditional econometric analysis of observational data. In the traditional approach,
one might examine annual data on homicide rates and changes in death penalty
legislation, and if a negative correlation were found, infer that the death penalty
caused lower homicide rates. 6 5 This is not the only possible inference. It is also
possible that political support for the death penalty is driven by the level of the
homicide rate, or that changes in both political support for the death penalty and
homicide were driven by some third factor. The existence of alternative
explanations undermines any policy conclusion firom an event study, since it would
be impossible to determine the cause of the drop in homicide rates. This problem
plagues current scholarship on the impact of the death penalty, causing the
66
estimates about deterrence to be widely inconsistent.

probability of winning presidency in prediction markets with prices in bond markets); Erik
Snowberg et al., PartisanImpacts on the Economy: Evidence from PredictionMarkets and
Close Elections, 122 Q.J. EcON. 807, 807 (2007) (using prediction market event study to
examine the effect of election results on economic variables); Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra
note 9, at 122-24 (discussing results from markets designed to predict the effect of political
and economic events on the 2004 presidential election).
64.
It is worth emphasizing that an event study does not reveal the actual effects
of the policy but rather a market-aggregated forecast of the likely effects of the policy.
65.
See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a
Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 Am. L. ECON. REV.
344, 344 (2003); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of

Life and Death, 65 Am.
66.

ECON. REv.

397, 398 (1975).

Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment

Morally Required? Acts Omissions and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58

STAN.

L. REV. 703, 706

(2005) with John Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of StatisticalEvidence in the

Death Penalty Debate, 58STAN. L. REv. 791, 792-94 (2005).
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Causation is easier to isolate over short time intervals, since the narrower
the window of time in which a market reaction is gauged, the less chance that
some other factor may have caused these sharp changes in expectations. Prediction
market event studies can compare market reactions just before and after policy
change announcements, which allow for cleaner causal inference. For example, a
prediction market of future homicide rates could include an "event study" test of
the effect of the announcement of a death penalty moratorium. This event study
would measure estimated fuiture homicide rates minutes before and after the
announcement of the moratorium, and thereby gauge the market's estimate of the
"value" of the moratorium on homicide rates.
An obvious problem here, as in all short-term event studies, is that the
market may have factored into the pre-announcement market price some
probability that the event to be tested would occur. So, if a prediction market is
running on the issue of future homicide rates in Illinois, and Illinois announces a
moratorium on capital punishment, there might be no change in the homicide
market if the market already "knew" that the governor planned to issue a
moratorium.6 This may lead to the mistaken inference that the policy would have
no effect. It is possible, of course, to look back to see changes in market prices that
might reflect leakage of information, but this is no more than guesswork. In a less
extreme case, if the markets had already assessed an 80% chance of a death
penalty moratorium, then the event study will reveal a rise in expected homicides
that is only one-fifth as large as the true causal effect of the moratorium, as fourfifths of the effect had already been priced in.
There is a solution to this problem that can be achieved by using a
combination of prediction market event studies. Using the death penalty
moratorium again as an example, imagine that we ran a parallel prediction market
on whether or not Illinois would abolish the death penalty. One could then
combine data from both an Illinois homicide rate prediction market and an Illinois
death penalty moratorium prediction market to derive an estimate of the causal
effect of a death penalty moratorium on the homicide rate. Very simply, the causal
effect of a policy can be measured as the expected change in crime rate (from one
prediction market) divided by the market estimate about whether the policy change
will be adopted (from another prediction market).6 Thus, if the announcement of a
moratorium led the markets to revise upward (downward) its homicide forecast by
10% and the market assessment of a moratorium rose 70%, we can infer the
market believes the impact of the moratorium on homicides would be an increase

67.
One need not believe entirely in the strong form of the efficient market-that
all information, whether public or not, is incorporated into market prices-to accept that
imparted information will often be baked into market prices. Something of significance, like
a death penalty moratorium, will be debated in public, or, if in private, will involve a
sufficient number of persons so as to raise the possibility of official or unofficial leaks, or
even just forward-looking political forecasts.
68.
In notation, this is: Acrime forecast / Aprobability the policy is adopted. A
necessary pre-condition to this generalizable conclusion is that one must find a usefuil
"event" to study, that is, one in which the probability of a policy being adopted changes in a
sufficiently discrete way.
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(decrease) in homicides of 14% .69 The ability to isolate such causal parameters
through multiple markets is a key advantage of prediction markets.
In addition to providing more accurate causation analyses than
observational econometric event studies, prediction market event studies can also
assess the likely causal impact of events or policies that have not and may not ever
happen. Under the econometric approach, one can only study the effect of policies
that have actually been implemented and observed. Under the event study
approach, all that is required is a "shock" to the likelihood that a policy will be
adopted. For instance, it may be that the election of a particular candidate for
governor will increase the likelihood of a death penalty moratorium, and hence it
would be instructive to also analyze the effects of the election on the crime
prediction markets.
At this point, a word of caution is in order. In many cases, identifying a
clean "shock" may be particularly difficult. For instance, it may be that the
election of a particular candidate for governor, who would raise the likelihood of a
death penalty moratorium being implemented, raises the likelihood of more
restrictions on the use of certain investigative tactics or force by police. If so, the
crime prediction markets may respond to changes in the likelihood of both
policies, leading the event study approach to confound the effects of executions
and those of police tactics. In other words, the credibility of an event study
depends crucially on identifying plausibly exogenous shocks to the policy being
examined. Therefore, the biggest practical difficulty with the event study approach
is that it is confined to issues for which there are useful "events" or "policy
shocks." In the next section, however, we address a potential solution that can
overcome this limitation.
2. Simple Contingent Markets
In a contingent market, individuals trade contracts whose payoffs are
linked both to the likelihood of a policy change and to subsequent levels of crime.
Contingent markets can use very simple math to determine the expected impact of
a particular policy choice on crime. Continuing with the example above, consider
that the governor of Illinois is contemplating a death penalty moratorium, and she
wants to know the best estimate of the impact of this policy choice on homicide
rates. The governor could review the vast literature on this subject, counting
studies for and against moratorium, perhaps weighted by the fame of their authors
or the rigor of the analysis performed. She could also ask for a report from a blueribbon commission comprised of experts in the field and politicians of note. These
are surely sensible things to do, and we should hope that politicians would be
thoughtful about decisions of this magnitude before they make them.
However, there are weaknesses to these traditional methods that make
them inferior to the market design postulated below. The work involved in
bringing a recommendation to the governor may be corrupted by the private
agenda of her staff or biased by the political conclusion the governor "wants" to

69.
Calculated as 10% change in crime forecast based on moratorium divided by
70% probability of moratorium = 0. 14.
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reach. For sure, the process is unlikely to produce a full or complete picture of the
debate, since even the most wisely chosen commission or staff is unlikely to bring
all available points of view to the table. In addition, as shown by the work of Cass
Sunstein and others, group decisions, either by the governor's staff or the
commission, are inferior to market-based mechanisms because of the potential for
polarization, hidden profiles (i.e., individuals with information may not reveal it
for social or psychological reasons), and other factors.7
Markets, on the other hand, allow for constant deliberation and
anonymous information-giving. This means that new information is instantly
revealed and priced into the market, and that individuals can update their views
based on the market price and market reactions to new information. And public
markets are transparent in ways that even the most open and public commission
inquiries cannot be. Given the recent history of contentious battles over various
high-profile policy debates, including issues of executive privilege and the public's
ability to know what goes on behind closed doors, any tool that increases the
transparency of the policy deliberation process without undermining the potential
71
to reach a positive result is a good thing.
Now let us consider an example of how a policy market might work. The
Illinois governor could learn about the deterrent effect of the death penalty by
floating four contracts on a prediction market, each paying $1 if in some fuiture
year one of the following occurs:
(a) There is a death penalty moratorium and homicide rates are
higher than today;
(b) There is a death penalty moratorium, and homicide rates are
lower than today;
(c) There is no death penalty moratorium, and homicide rates are
higher than today; or
(d) There is no death penalty moratorium, and homicide rates are
lower than today.
These markets could be run in a variety of ways, but one potential design
(consistent with current methods for making public policy) would be to limit the
participants to a set number of experts, law enforcement officials, academics,
notable citizens, community leaders, politicians, and so on, but to post the prices
on a government website, thereby allowing the public to have a continual window
into the "market's" view on the question. One benefit of this transparency is that it
would encourage political accountability-politicians who opt to ignore the market
would likely have to build a strong case for their position.

70.

See SuNs-TEIN, supra note 11, at 65.
71.
The two most famous examples from the past two decades are the energy
task force led by Vice President Cheney, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S.
367, 39 1-92 (2004) (holding for administration in a lawsuit involving challenge to lack of
openness in proceedings), and the health care task force led by First Lady Hillary Clinton,
see Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Hillary Rodham Clinton, 997 F.2d 898,
916 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ruling in case challenging openness of proceedings).

HeinOnline -- 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 42 2010

20101

PREDICTING CRIME

43

Based on the trading prices of the four securities described above, we can
determine the market's view of the impact of the moratorium (or the deterrent
effect of the death penalty) by interpreting the prices of each of these securities as
probabilities. To determine the market's combined view of the impact of the
moratorium, we would want to compare the probability that homicide rates will be
lower with no death penalty with the probability that homicide rates will be lower
with a death penalty. From the four securities, these probabilities are:
Probability that homicide rate will decrease with no death penalty=
b/(a+b), and
Probability that homicide rate will decrease with death penalty =
d/(c+d),
where a equals the price of contract (a) above, b equals the price of contract (b)
above, and so forth. If the death penalty is in fact perceived to be a significant
deterrent, the latter probability should be substantially lower than the former.
Consider a numerical example: assume that the price of security (a)
(moratorium & higher homicide rates) is $0.60; the price of security (b)
(moratorium & lower) is $0.20; the price of security (c) (no moratorium & higher)
is $0.30; and the price of security (d) (no moratorium & lower) is $0.70. We can
conclude the probability of a reduction in homicides with a death penalty
moratorium is 25% (.20/(.60+.20) = .25), and the probability of a reduction in
homicides with the death penalty is 70% (.70/(.30+.70) = .70). This would suggest
that the market believes there is a strong deterrent effect from the death penalty,
since the probability that the homicide rate will decrease is forty-five percentage
points higher with the existence of a death penalty.
3. Advanced ContingentMarkets
This is, of course, not the only potential prediction market that can be
used to answer policy questions, such as the death penalty example above. Parallel
prediction market contracts with policy contingencies can also help unpack the
causal impact of particular policies. For instance, one could float a pair of forward
contracts with the policy choice (X or not-X) imbedded in each. Both contracts
would have payoffs tied to a prediction of future crime rates, but one would pay
off only if an enumerated contingency comes to bear (X), while the other would
pay off only if the contingency does not happen (not-X). The policy contingency
could be increased policing, different sentence lengths, new rehabilitation or
treatment programs, or the use of capital punishment.
To continue with the death penalty moratorium example, the governor
who is interested in determining the best guess about the deterrent effect of the
death penalty in Illinois could create a market with two prediction market
contracts, Class A and Class B. Both Class A and Class B contracts pay (at the end
of the market) $1 for each homicide that occurs in a particular year in the future.
But Class A contracts pay out if and only if Illinois has the death penalty (and all
bets are refunded if Illinois does not have the death penalty), and Class B contracts
pay out if and only if there is a death penalty moratorium. As such, the prices of
these two prediction market contracts should reveal the expected number of
homicides with the death penalty in force and the expected number of homicides
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without the death penalty.7 The difference between the prices of these prediction
market contracts (at any time) reveals the extent to which the market anticipates a
higher or lower homicide count as a result of a death penalty moratorium.7
While this design yields a useful point estimate of the market's view
about the impact of a policy change, it says little about the precision of the
estimate. 7 4 Other market designs can help policymnakers understand the uncertainty
surrounding the market's estimate. Consider an altemnative design: a prediction
market is created with a series of contracts that pay $1 if a trader accurately
predicts both the homicide rate and whether Illinois has the death penalty. For
instance, one example would be a contract paying $1 if Illinois has the death
penalty in a particular future year and the homicide rate is between 7 and 8 per
100,000 people in that year. The contract would stipulate that if the first part of the
contract is not fulfilled-such as where Illinois does not have the death penalty in
the future year-then those trades are simply refunded. These markets would
reveal the full probability distribution of likely homicide rates under both a death
penalty regime, and under a moratorium. Figure 2 illustrates using artificial data.

72.
In simple notation: (E[Homicides I Death penalty]); and (EfHomicides I
Death penalty moratorium]).
73.
If there were 650 homicides in Illinois in 2006, and the market believes the
number will stay about the same in the absence of a death penalty moratorium, the Class A
contract should trade at around $650. If the market believes that homicides will increase
(decrease) by 10% in the event of a moratorium, then the Class B contract would trade for
$715 ($585). The difference between the prices of these two contracts specifies this market
estimate of the impact of the moratorium.
74.
Or, more fuilly, the precision of the market's conditional expectations.
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Figure 2:
Prediction Market Forecasts of Homicide Rate Under Alternative Scenarios
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This chart reveals the market's assessment of the probability of each
outcome under the two alternative policies. Importantly, these probabilistic
assessments can then be combined to reveal not just the market's assessment of the
most likely impact of eliminating the death penalty, but also the full distribution of
risks. More formally, the market-assessed probability distribution function of the
homicide rate with the death penalty is shown in the leftmost panel; we denote this
fth,J1). The next panel shows a similar distribution, denotedf(1, 0), for the no-deathpenalty scenario. The effects of eliminating the death penalty, x, are also uncertain,
and the likelihood of various impacts is given by the probability distribution
function g(x). If the effects of death penalty elimination are additive and
uncorrelated with the remaining surprise in the crime rate under the status quo,
then the uncertain impact of the death penalty can be derived as the deconvolution
of the two market-assessed probability distributions. 75 This is shown in Figure 3.

75.

That is, by Bayes Rule, f(h, 1) = ff(h',O0) -g (h
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Figure 3:
Prediction Market Forecast
Implied Effect of the Death Penalty
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The key advantage of this analysis is the ability to see the entire
distribution of potential outcomes from the use of the death penalty or other policy
choice. Existing assessments of death penalty policy rely on comparisons of point
estimates (that is, the mean of these distributions). For example, the classic death
penalty deterrence study is one in which comparisons are made of average
homicide rates one year prior to and one year after a moratorium or abolition.7 A
leading study uses this approach and concludes that each additional execution
decreases homicides by about five."7 Another study by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and
Shepherd used a system of simultaneous equations and county-level panel data that
covered 3054 counties for the 1977-1996 period 7. Their models were designed to
assess the effects of the death penalty by analyzing fluctuations in crime rates
immediately after a death sentence is carried out, by using moving averages to
measure the conditional probability of execution, given a death sentence, and then
explore effects on the crime rate. They found that each execution prevents about
eighteen homicides on average.7 More recent studies find some ambiguity in the
76.
See Hashemn Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: Evidence from a "Judicial Experiment, " 44 ECON. INQUIRY 512,

518-519, tbls.3 & 4 (2006) (using data from 1960 to 2000).
77.

See id.

78.

Dezhbakhsh et al, supra note 65, at 359.

79.

Idat 361.
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data on homicide rate averages, concluding that "the existing evidence for
deterrence is surprisingly fragile, and even small changes in specifications yield
dramatically different results." 80 Those studies base their argument on the fact that
the death penalty has been "applied so rarely that the number of homicides it can
plausibly have caused or deterred cannot be reliably disentangled from the large
year-to-year changes in the homicide rate caused by other factors.",8 ' All of these
studies use historical data and average homicide rates.
The advantage of the contingent prediction markets we propose in this
paper is the ability to compare full probability distributions in a way that makes
policy choices more informed, since the full range of potential outcomes is
revealed instead of just the mean of the distribution. For example, it may be that
the mean change from the elimination of the death penalty is negligible, but that
the distribution of outcomes changes dramatically and with downside risks that are
untenable for policymnakers. Existing studies do not offer this potential form of
analysis.
These conditional markets also exploit the true power of prediction
markets, in that they elicit the expectations of market participants even about states
of nature that do not currently (and may never) exist. As such, it is not necessary
for Illinois to actually implement a death penalty moratorium, or for a police chief
to actually reallocate resources to a particular t' e of crime, to use prediction
markets to study the likely effects of doing so.8 ? It is this feature that makes
conditional markets so promising for counterfactual policy analysis. One
obvious problem remains-distinguishing correlation from causation in these
markets-and we turn to this next.
4. From Correlationto Causation

We have shown how contingent markets can be useful for revealing
market-aggregated assessments of conditional expectations, for example, what the
homicide rate will be in Chicago if the governor institutes a death penalty
moratorium. While these contingent markets solve the difficulty of generating
expectations of various correlations, they do not in any way solve the problem of
distinguishing correlation from causation. Markets might predict changes in the
variable being measured-homicide rates-but this could be because of facts
unrelated to the policy change being studied by the market. Continuing with the
death penalty example, if we observe the market predicting an increase in
homicides if a death penalty moratorium is implemented by the incoming governor
of Illinois, it may be because the market believes the moratorium will lower the
cost of murder, leading to more of them on the margin. Or it may be because the
market believes the governor will generally be "soft on crime," thereby lowering
80.
Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 66, at 794.
81.
Id.
82.
It bears repeating that these markets do not predict the actual outcome of the
underlying question being forecast, but rather represent the market's best guess as to what
the outcome will be. In any policy-making process, a market forecast is likely to be one
input of many. Our claim is simple: a well-designed prediction market will likely yield as
good or better estimates than any other available method.
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the costs of all crime, leading to more crime, including murder, on the margin. 8
As such, the market's expectation of a positive correlation between the death
penalty and murder rates may not reflect a causal link.
A common econometrical solution to this problem is to exploit "natural
experiments" -that is, to analyze the effects on the policy in question by
measuring the effects of clearly exogenous shocks to policy. What is needed is an
unexpected policy change that is not associated with potentially confounding
variables. This shock would, like the prediction market event studies discussed
above, allow a cleaner test of policy causation than a policy change that was
correlated with potential confounding variables. The potential to use this widely
accepted methodology is even greater with contingent prediction markets, since
84
market designers can create their own shocks through contract design.
We propose the use of markets, called "Prediction Instrumental
Variables," (Prediction IVs), 85 that allow policymakers to simulate exogenous
policy shocks as a way of testing the causal significance of the shock.8 The first
step in creating these markets is to think of a plausible and exogenous shock to the
policy variable. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling banning capital
punishment would certainly be an exogenous shock to death penalty policy. This
sudden change would affect both death penalty and non-death penalty states, and
without the potentially corrupting variables of changes in state administration of
the laws. The death penalty states would provide the data for testing the policy
change (a death penalty moratorium) while those states without an active death
penalty statute would be a useful control group. One could then collect data on
how much execution and homicide rates changed, by state, and then compute a
simple Wald Estimator of the causal effect of the execution rate on the homicide

rate :87

fi

= (average Ahomicide rate in death penalty states average
Ahomicide rate in non-death penalty states) / (Average execution
rate in death penalty statesbefore)

83.
We mean nothing by this politically, as the authors are likely not of one mind
about any of the underlying policy issues that prediction markets could be used for in this
area. This is just a stereotype, of course. In reality it was a Republican governor that
implemented the death penalty moratorium in Illinois, and a Democrat governor that
reinstated the death penalty.
84.
The obvious difficulty with analyzing policy shocks, like a federal ban on the
death penalty, is that one can only analyze those shocks that actually occur. But a key
advantage of contingent markets is that one can recover expectations of a conditional
expectation, even on contingencies that never occur.
85.
"IV" here stands for "instrumental variable."
86.
See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions About Prediction
Markets, in INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS INTHE PUB3LIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS 13-14 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2003).
87.
This Wald Estimator representation is equivalent to a two-stage least squares
set-up, running a first-stage equation: Execution rates after - Execution rates before = a
Active death penalty statutes before, and in the second-stage, estimating Homicide rates
after - Homicide rates before = fl PredictedAExecution rate + y
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In the real world, such instrumental variables (IVs) are not freely
available, and indeed, the Court has not provided an experiment like this since
1972.8 In addition, exogenous shocks that are interesting enough to be studied
may be so severe-as in the case of a federal ban on the death penalty-as to
render the policy debate, at least at a state political level, moot. In other words,
state policymnakers would want to know before a federal ban whether a death
penalty moratorium is likely to increase, decrease, or have no effect on murder
rates.
The prediction markets we have in mind, however, are not disabled by
either of these shortcomings. Prediction IVs enable policymakers to ask a
prediction market what is expected to occur if the shock happens, whether or not it
will happen. Instead of waiting for the Supreme Court to ban the death penalty, in
which case it is too late anyway, a policymnaker could create a prediction market to
trade two contracts that estimate the expected deterrent effect of the death penalty:
Contract A: Pay $1 for each percentage point rise in the homicide
rate from 2008 until 2012 in current death-penalty states, with the
proviso that the bet is only active if the Supreme Court rules that the
death penalty is unconstitutional;
Contract B: Pay $1 for each percentage point rise in the homicide
rate from 2008 until 2012 in current non-death-penalty states, with
the proviso that the bet is only active if the Supreme Court rules that
the death penalty is unconstitutional.
Contract A pays $1 for every percentage point increase in crime in death
penalty states if the death penalty was ruled unconstitutional, and if it is not, trades
would be unwound. The market should therefore price Contract A as the
expectation of the crime rate in death penalty states conditional on the death
penalty being unconstitutional. Contract B is the same, except it applies to the nondeath penalty states. So the difference in the prices of Contract A and Contract B is
essentially the market's expectation of what a differences-in-differences estimate
of the effect of the death penalty ban will be in 2012, conditional on there being a
ban. These markets yield a market-based prediction of the causal effect of
executions on homicides. Some very simple math gives us a formula that
89
policymnakers can use to measure causal impact.
For example, the population of states with the death penalty is about 260
million people, and these states had a homicide rate of about 5.5 per 100,000

88.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
89.
This simplifies to: f3-(a-b)/average execution rate in death penalty states
2008. The numerator tells you crime will rise (fall) a certain percent faster in death penalty
states than non-death penalty states if the death penalty is banned, so hence the death was
deterring (encouraging) a certain number of crimes. The denominator scales the estimate.
(The denominator would normally be the difference in the execution rate in DP and non-DP
states. But since executions are of course zero in non-DP states, this difference is just the
number of executions in the DP states.) Dividing by the number of executions before the
death penalty ban tells you how many crimes are being deterred for each execution.
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people for 2005, meaning there were about 14,000 murders in these states. 90 The
contracts described above can help determine the deterrent effect of the death
penalty in these states. Say that Contract A was trading at $6 and Contract B was
trading at $2. In this case, the market expectation is that a death penalty ban would
cause a 4% increase in homicides, or an extra 560 murders as a result of the ban.
To figure the deterrent effect of the death penalty, we divide the number of extra
homicides by the number of executions. There were 32 executions in 2006,9' so
the market view of the deterrent effect would be about 18 homicides deterred per

execution. 9
Similar markets can be imagined in a variety of crime forecasting and
policy areas. Exogenous shocks could be changes in sentences for particular
crimes, changes in gun laws, the deployment of ubiquitous security cameras, the
allocation of additional crime-fighting resources, and so on.
111. DESIGN ISSUES
While the previous Part discussed possible uses of prediction market
prices in the policy process and some potential market designs, we now turn to
discussing the "engineering issues" involved in actually setting up useful markets
in this area. We only touch on some of the key issues for these markets, given time
and space constraints.
A. Contractability
For any trade to take place, "contractability" is needed, meaning that the
contract must clearly present the policy question at issue, while being specific and
detailed enough to be enforceable in a low cost way. If a contract is vague or can
be interpreted in more than one way at its resolution, the market will result in
disputes and indeterminate outcomes, since traders' actions in the market might
have been based on an interpretation of the contract that was inconsistent with its
actual intent. Consider the following prediction market designed to estimate future
crime rates: "this contract pays $1 for each percentage point drop in crime-related
deaths in Chicago from 2008 to 2012." This contract cannot create a legitimate
prediction since it is unclear what a "crime-related death" is, how it will be
measured, what data will be used to resolve the market, what is meant by
"Chicago," and so on. A better, but perhaps not perfect, contract mnight say: "this
contract pays $1 for each percentage point drop in homicide rates for Chicago,
Illinois, as reported in the initial estimate of 2009 homicide rates issued by the FBI
Uniform Crime Reporting program." As this example shows, all contracts must
specify a date by which the forecast event must occur, a measurement technology,
Homicide rates and population are based on 2005 data. See FBI, CRIME IN
2005 (2006).
91.
Ten states executed prisoners in 2007. See Dealth Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=1 86 (last visited Feb. 25,
2010). Texas accounted for 60% of all (state and federal) executions in 2007. See id. The
other states carrying out death sentences were: Alabama (2); Arizona (1); Georgia (1);
Indiana (2); Ohio (2); Oklahoma (2); South Carolina (1); South Dakota (1); and Tennessee
(1). See id
92.
This is simply: (6-2)/32 = 0.13.
90.

THE UNITED STATES
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and a mechanism for determining whether the forecast event occurred. There are,
however, no easy answers to the questions of contract design, and some trial and
error will be inevitable. To aid states and local governments interested in running
these markets, we include in our "modest proposal" below a suggestion that the
federal government take the lead on encouraging these markets, including
consideration of potential contract terms. These markets could then be tweaked at
the non-federal level, allowing the many governments and law enforcement
agencies to be laboratories for contract design experimentation.
Because policymnakers likely care more about abstract measures, like
levels of "public safety," than individual indicators of them, contractability
constraints would seem to limit the usefulness of these markets. Although the
police chief may be interested in knowing how many burglaries are likely next
year, it is more likely that policymnakers at City Hall, in the legislature, or even in
the police department, are more interested in whether public safety is expected to
improve or decline in the next year. So ideally one would run a market predicting
the overall level of public safety, but this would suffer from the obvious
shortcomings of measurability and ambiguity discussed above. Clever contract
design, however, can overcome these constraints. So while we can't imagine a
contract paying based on how "safe" Chicago is, a contract linked to whether a
majority of the population will answer that "they feel safer this year than last" in a
future Gallup Poll would be robust enough for a prediction market. There are a
variety of existing surveys that could be used for this base-lining function.
The use of a neutrally determined baseline, such as those provided by
polls or expert reports, can be used to dramatically expand the power of
policymnaking prediction markets. For example, the National Academy of Sciences
publishes periodic reports on issues such as whether the death penalty is a
deterrent. These expert reports, drawn on the best thinking of experts in the field,
are conducted in a manner designed to yield a deliberative answer that improves
on any individual expert view, and that is insulated to some extent from politics. A
prediction market could run the outcome of the next report. So, while one cannot
run markets directly on whether "the death penalty is a deterrent," one can float
contracts paying $1 if "the next National Academy of Sciences panel on the death
penalty concludes that the evidence of a deterrent effect is not persuasive." Even if
such a report is not planned or expected for some time, the market would provide
an estimate of the current best thinking on the issue. There are obvious problems
with this from a contractibility perspective, such as the need for a third-party judge
to interpret the text of the report.9 But we believe these can be overcome. There
93.
Contractability issues can turn out to be surprisingly subtle and difficult to
forecast in advance. For instance, the online prediction market Inlrade.com offered a
contract on whether Yasser Arafat would depart the Palestinian state by the end of 2005,
and there was some controversy on whether the departure of his corpse would count as his
departure. On a lighter note, newsfutures.com offered markets that paid off "if Harry Potter
is alive at the end of the novel 'Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows'." Subsequently there
was some controversy on how the claim would be settled if an epilogue to the book
described Harry Potter as dying of natural causes after a long and happy life. As a final
example, the Iowa Electronic Markets floated contracts linked to the number of seats won
by each party in the 1994 Senate elections, and settlement of these contracts was
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are numerous prediction markets currently operating with similar or greater
amounts of ambiguity, and the market makers do not have to frequently unwind
trades or settle disputes.
Another key issue regarding contract design is whether there is useful
information to be aggregated. Aggregating mechanisms are only valuable when
there exists useful information held among diverse and numerous individuals, and
the aggregation process will collect it without biases that mislead or use selective
information.9 As a result, if the information that diverse market participants
provide through trading does not improve upon publicly available information,
because perhaps it is less tangible, less trustworthy, or less relevant, it is doubtful
that the market could improve on any official forecast. For example, InTrade.com
floated contracts on whether weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found
in Iraq, and in April 2003 these markets wrongly predicted that it was very likely
that weapons would be discovered by mid-2003. Because these weapons can be
non-existent everywhere in the view of market participants and yet still exist,
disperse information about their non-existence was unlikely to overturn the strong
case made by the White House.
In the crime policy prediction markets we propose the problem of diverse
market participants not improving on publicly available information is unlikely to
be a barrier to successful markets. For one, the predictions generally will not be
running up against official pronouncements about the future, as in the case of the
Iraq WMD issue. While the government does issue actual historical results, the
markets will pre-date these, and in fact will be designed to predict them. It is
unlikely that markets would therefore be systematically biased by government
announcements. In addition, many individuals with access to the markets will have
information relevant to the questions being examined in the market. As discussed
above, criminologists, law enforcement personnel, doctors, neighbors, and
criminals themselves possess information that when aggregated by a prediction
market is likely to exceed any information held by any single individual or group.
This is especially true since these traders can be expected to use a myriad of
sources and types of data, including expert models, police officers' observations,
the gut feeling of observant residents, what the doctors in the emergency room are
seeing, what the lawyers trying cases know about law enforcement levels, and
what the prison wardens or guards see among prison populations.
B. Contract Choice
There are three basic contract types, and each can yield different insights
into the market's beliefs, revealing a probability, mean, or median. We have used
two of these three so far. First, there are binary option contracts in which a winnertake-all market will pay $1 if a specific event occurs. An example might be a
contract paying $1 if the FBI reports a homicide rate in 2012 that is higher than 6
homicides per 100,000 of population. The price of this contract can be interpreted
confounded by the fact that Senator Richard Shelby switched sides to become a Republican
the day after the election (and before all results were finalized).
94.
This is the classic GIGO principle-Garbage In, Garbage Out-that impacts

any information aggregation tool.
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as a market-aggregated probability that the event-an FBI report of this murder
rate-will occur. 9 5 As we have shown above, a family of such contracts (paying if
the homicide rate is 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 and so on) will yield a full probability
distribution. Second, there are linear index contracts with payoffs that vary onefor-one with the event that one is trying to forecast. An example might be a
contract that pays $1 per homicide that occurs in 2012 as reported by the FBI. The
price of this contract will reveal the expected number of homicides.
Finally, in "spread" betting, traders do not bid on the price of a contract,
but rather on the cutoff that determines whether an event occurs. For example, the
market maker stipulates that the price of the contract is $0.50, and it pays $1 if the
homicide rate is higher than some cutoff, y. All of the parameters of this contract
are pre-determined, except the cutoff y, which is determined in the market by
trading behavior. 96 An even-money bet reveals the market's expectation of the
median outcome, and hence can be interpreted as a forecast that the homicide rate
is as likely to be higher than y, as it is to be lower than y. If instead, the contract
costs $4 and pays $5 if the homicide rate exceeds y, then this will elicit a value of y
that the markets believe to be a four-fifths probability. Analogously, one can
design spread contracts to elicit any particular percentile of the probability
distribution of future outcomes. As such, this may be a particularly useful form of
contract when policymnakers are interested in confidence-interval forecasts.
The design of contracts should take into account likely market
imperfections, including transaction costs and behavioral anomalies. Consider an
example of each. Although prediction markets can be created in ways that make
the actual costs of trading extremely low, 97 some contract types may have
commitment costs that would reduce the liquidity of the market. Linear index
contracts, for instance, may provide little incentive to trade relative to transaction
costs. To see this, consider a contract that pays $1 for each homicide committed in
Chicago in 20 10 as reported by the FBI. The market price for this contract is $500,
meaning the market is predicting 500 homicides in that year. An individual trader
learns of very strong information that the number of homicides is likely to be 505.
It is very unlikely that the individual will trade based on this information, since she
must commit $500 to the market for each $5 she expects to gain. The market
would then get stuck at an inaccurate, but fairly close, estimate of the actual
outcome. In light of this problem, it is probably no surprise to note that winnertake-all binary contracts have proven much more popular with traders in most
98
prediction markets.

See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Interpreting Prediction Market Prices
95.
as Probabilities, (NBER Working Paper No. 10359, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12200.

96.
The most popular example of spread betting is point-spread betting in
football, where the bet is whether or not a team will win by at least a certain number of
points.
97.
Iowa markets work with hundreds of dollars total committed.
This problem can be seen in prediction markets for political elections. If the
98.
market is, say, predicting the share of the two-party vote in an election, a winner-take-all
binary contract will be far more effective at encouraging trading.
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Behavioral anomalies that can disable markets generally also have the
potential to cause problems with prediction markets. 99 One that is particularly
troubling for prediction markets is the tendency for people to be very poorly
calibrated at differentiating small probability events from very small probability
events. This leads very small probability events to be priced as small probabilities,
suggesting that market prices particularly close to zero (or one) may be biased.
This anomaly is a key feature of Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory, and
indeed, the bias toward overbetting on tiny probabilities is strongly evident in
many gambling markets as a "favorite-longshot bias." 100 With this evidence of
mispricing of very small probabilities in hand, it seems likely that markets may be
poorly calibrated to small probability crime events. For most crime forecasting
markets we have discussed, this is not likely to be problematic, because crime rate
forecasting does not involve very small or even small probabilities.
For questions that the market maker believes involve very small
probabilities, simple refraining of contract terms can help yield more useful data.
For example, suppose policymakers are interested in multiple-victim shootings and
want to know whether they are likely to happen in Illinois. A contract paying $1 if
there is such a shooting in Illinois in January involves small or very small
probabilities, and may be subject to this longshot bias. A market that pays $1 if
Illinois is the next state to experience a multiple-victim shooting may be better
calibrated. Here again we see how clever contract design can be used to expand the
efficacy of these markets.
C Market Scope
The value of prediction markets comes from the fact that they aggregate
information, but thus far we have not described precisely what information would
be aggregated. This is really a question about who should participate in these
markets. It seems clear, for instance, that one would want to ensure that the
markets reflect both the macro-level insights of criminologists and the street-level
intelligence of police around the country. This does not necessarily mean that
individual officers have to be permitted to trade because presumably a lot of their
information would be aggregated by police chiefs. 10' There are complicated
tradeoffis here that cannot be resolved in theory but only in practice. For example,
issues of sabotage or other market manipulation, the potential for trading to
distract from job performance, the creation of skewed incentives, and so on are all
present in decisions about who to include in the market.
As a general matter, we would suggest that there should be a presumption
against ever limiting participation in markets. The reason for this presumption is
99.
8, at 1350.
100.

See

SUNSTEIN,

supra note 11, at 123; Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note

See Richard H. Thaler & William T. Ziemba, Anomalies: ParimutuelBetting

Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries, J. EcON.

PERSP.,

Spring 1988, at 161, 163; Eric C.

Snowberg & Justin Wolfers, Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or
Misperceptions?.
NBER
Research
Paper
(2007),
available
at
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/research.shtml#FLbias.
101.
This suggests that it may be important to try to recruit traders through groups
such as the Police Executive Research Forum.
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simply that those designing markets often do not know where the most valuable
information resides. Indeed, if policymnakers knew precisely who had information
about future crime trends, it would probably make more sense to simply interview
those experts than to run prediction markets. Thus, one of the roles of prediction
markets is to provide incentives for those with relevant information to identify'
themselves. Similarly, allowing broad access to the market also increases the
liquidity in the market, and while even very small-scale prediction markets
(involving as few as a dozen or so traders) have yielded useful forecasts, larger
markets are likely to yield more accurate forecasts.
This is in part because of the presence of uninformed traders. While
including "noise traders" might be expected to add only noise to prediction market
forecasts, it is the presence of uninformed noise traders that provides an incentive
for better-informed traders to actually participate in the market. 10 2 The presence of
uninformed traders also provides an incentive for informed traders to invest in
further information discovery and research, likely making the market more
efficient.
Despite the presumption toward unlimited access to trading, there are
three important reasons that one may want to limit the universe of traders in a
crime prediction market. First, prediction markets do not simply aggregate
information; they broadcast it to anyone who can see the market price. If the
relevant information one seeks to aggregate is classified, such as FBI intelligence
on terrorist threats, then these secrecy needs can be respected only by allowing
those with a sufficient security clearance to trade in the markets.
Second, substantial asymmetric information, and, in particular, insider
trading may destroy the incentive to trade in a market. For instance, allowing the
staff who compile the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) to trade in prediction
markets tied to the yet-to-be-released UCR data gives them a tremendous
advantage. If other traders fear that the person on the other side of a transaction
may already know what the crime rate is, they will be reluctant to trade. If the
information asymmetry is strong enough, no trades will occur at all. Barring the
insiders from trading, however, comes at a cost: arguably the most useful
10 3
information is not aggregated.
Third, there may be other very real practical reasons to limit participation
in a market, such as where a research sponsor subsidizes trades, or where limiting
participation is the price of obtaining regulatory approval for the market.
Finally, as mentioned above, allowing certain types of individuals to trade
may have positive and negative externalities on job performance, community

102.
See Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1326 (1985) (describing role played by noise traders in creating
incentives for informed traders to trade in the market).
103.

For an interesting proposal for dealing with insider trading within firms, see

Robin Hanson, Insider Trading and Prediction Markets, (George Mason Univ. Working
Paper 2007), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/insiderbet.pdf (proposing several options,
including, designating some informed insiders as "well-informed traders" and requiring
them to preannounce trades when dealing with less well-informed traders).
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policing, and neighborhood relations. These are real issues that will be worked out
only through practical experiments and trials.
One reason that is often offered for limiting market participation that we
find unpersuasive is that there is a risk of sabotage or manipulation of the market
by bad actors. In the area of crime, as was the case for the scuttled terrorism
market, this concern may be a real political roadblock. As policymnakers might not
want to give the impression that criminals could somehow "profit" twice from
their crimes (the crime and the market profits), or be encouraged to commit crimes
to achieve profits in the prediction markets. While politically sensitive, we believe
these concemns are largely overblown.
As discussed fully elsewhere,1"4 sabotage and manipulation are a risk in
all markets, but there is nothing inherent in crime prediction markets that provides
added incentives. Given the very small stakes we imagine will be sufficient to
produce meaningful outputs, a criminal would be foolish to take on added
real-world risk in order to eamn profits on the order of hundreds or even thousands
of dollars. This is especially true when one considers that criminals will not know
the underlying factors affecting the market's movement. In any event, any
individual criminal will have a negligible impact on the total number of crimes
being forecast.105 Finally, public safety officials can monitor trades to some extent,
especially large and suspicious trades, in the way that securities markets and the
SEC monitors stock trades. In this way, suspicious trades or traders that eamn large
profits can be important signals of potential criminal activity, both in the market
and in the real world.
As for the unclean hands argument-that criminals should not be allowed
to participate in these markets-this too is politically sensitive but ultimately a red
herring. Criminals of all sorts have very valuable information about future crime
patterns, and unlocking this information and aggregating it with other information
is a major motivation for some of these markets. Although it may seem untoward
to have criminals participating, giving them some quid for the quo of contributing
information is not morally or ethically different from plea bargaining, reducing
sentences for testifyiing against confederates, treating snitches well, and a variety
of other police and prosecutorial tactics. In fact, markets are likely to give more
high-powered incentives for information sharing since they are anonymous, have a
financial incentive, and can be used to filter out bad information. Snitches do not
have incentives to lie or mislead in markets, where the information is bound to be
corrected by other market participants with better and contradictory information.

104.
See Abramowitz & Henderson, supra note 8.
105.
Sabotage possibilities exist in all markets, but they are extremely rare. After
all, criminals can currently sell short the shares of any number of public companies and then
act to destroy their value. We tolerate the slight risk of this because of the existence of
criminal deterrence and because of the benefits of such markets. Moreover, if prediction
market stakes are set at relatively low levels, the gains from manipulating the market will be
dwarfed by the likely criminal penalties.

HeinOnline -- 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 56 2010

20101

2010J
PREDICTING CRIME

5
57

D. Liquidity
A key practical concern held by many about prediction markets is that
they may not be able to generate sufficient liquidity to make prices truly reflect a
market-based aggregation of all available data. Perhaps this is not unexpected, as a
famous economics proposition, the "no-trade theorem," 06 predicts that no two
rational profit-motivated agents will ever trade with each other. The intuition is
simply that each will trade only if they believe themselves to be at an
informational advantage to the other; thus, if one reveals a willingness to bet, this
may lead the other to question their belief in their own informational advantage,
hence becoming unwilling to bet.
In practice, the assumptions underlying this theorem are often violated,
and a range of other motivations may lead someone to trade. Our evidence on this
is partial and collected across a range of prediction contexts. For instance, risk
love, or the "thrill of the gamble" clearly motivates huge amounts of trade on
sporting events. While forecasting crime may never be as thrilling as forecasting
the outcome of a football game, recent growth in political prediction markets and
07
other areas suggests cause for optimism.'
Career concerns provide another useful motivation for trade. For instance,
when prediction markets in economic indicators were established in 2004, many
financial market economists were asked by their employers whether the firm
should now trade directly based on their forecasts. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that at least a few felt that they had to trade in order to signal their belief in their
own ability.
More generally, reputation may play a key factor in stimulating trade.
While Google operates an internal prediction market with real money rewards,
their traders report that they are really motivated by the possibility of being
declared the top trader in a specific quarter. Indeed, the success of play-money
exchanges like the Hollywood Stock Exchange suggests that feelings of
community, or reputational concerns, can be quite important. The more public and
formal the system of prizes, the greater the incentive it can yield. For instance,
finance students at Wharton compete in a play-money stock market prediction
market, and many of the top performers list their scores on their resumes,
suggesting that there is an employment-related payoff. This seems like a useful
106.
P. Milgromn & N. Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26 J.
EcoN. THEORY 17, 27 (1982).
107.
Political prediction markets, such as those offered by companies like Intrade
and Betfair, as well as those run by academics, pollsters, and others, are now commonly
cited in analyzing political races. See, e.g., John Stossel & Maxim Lott, Foretelling the
Future: Online Prediction Markets, ABC NEWS, May 9, 2008, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/IBusiness/Stossel~story?id=48 13558&page=l. In fact, prediction
markets are now viewed as important enough signals of future outcomes that interested
parties are trying to manipulate them. In a famous incident during the 2004 presidential
election, someone tried to manipulate the market, which was showing John Kerry losing to
George Bush. The attempted manipulation did not work. See Donald Luskin, Who's Behind
the Bush-Futures Attacks?, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof luskinlluskin2004l 018113 2.asp.
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idea for a crime prediction market, as a formal system of trader recognition may
well enhance the reputations of particularly accurate criminologists.
Finally, a very simple way to stimulate trade is to provide a direct
financial incentive. A simple method would involve a market sponsor directly
fuinding the accounts of traders with the sponsor only able to withdraw funds after
a trading threshold has been met. A more indirect method would involve the
market maker setting up a specific trading account designed to lose money. Thus,
by offering to bet randomly, the house can effectively turn the prediction market
from a zero-sum game for traders into a positive-sum game. By analogy, the same
incentive for informed traders to participate exists if it is not the market maker
losing money, but instead some uninformed third party. Indeed, this is one of the
reasons why (perhaps paradoxically) the key to generating substantial trade can be
in attracting uninformed traders, because they provide the incentive for the
informed to trade, thereby revealing their information.
E. Legal Concerns and Practical Tradeoffs
Finally, legal, ethical, and political concerns still may pose something of a
barrier to the adoption of prediction markets for crime forecasting, particularly in
the United States. On the legal side, it is essential that a crime prediction market
not violate relevant anti-gambling laws at both the state and federal levels. One
innovative solution used by firms has been to have the employer provide the
endowment for each individual's trading account, under the theory that if one can
win but not lose, then one is not gambling. An alternative approach involves the
use of play-money markets, perhaps supplemented by some prize for the traders
with the highest play-money bankrolls at the end of each quarter.
In terms of ethical (and hence political) concerns, Alvin Roth notes that
moral repugnance about certain types of market transactions often constrains the
development of market institutions.1 He notes that a prominent role for money
can trigger repugnance, but that with creative market design, the role for money
can be minimized.OO Thus, despite widespread repugnance at the possibility of a
market in kidneys, if two patients each have willing but incompatible donors, an
in-kind exchange is perceived as quite acceptable. Similarly, the possibility of
profiting from terror was perceived as sufficiently repugnant that an effort within
the Department of Defense to set up prediction markets related to geopolitical risk
led to a political furor and the cancellation of that program."
These examples suggest the need for a careful assessment of the political
implications of a crime-forecasting prediction market. Again, careful design can
help frame the relevant issues. While it may be repugnant for a trader to profit
from a homicide, equivalent transactions in life insurance markets trigger no such
reaction. Alternatively, while some may find it repugnant to profit from death, few
108.
Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. EcoN. PERSP.,
Summer 2007, at 37.
109.
Id.
110.
See Robin D. Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, 128 PUB. CHOICE
257, 257 (2006) (noting that much of the political opposition was not in fact to any of the
markets that the researchers involved actually proposed).
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would argue with giving crime forecasters with a strong track record greater
recognition. Thus, play-money markets are much less likely to trigger repugnance
and, hence, political difficulties.
If these political, legal, and ethical constraints are insurmountable, the
implication is not that crime forecasting should continue in its current form. The
key insight from the emerging literature on prediction markets is that the wisdom
of crowds often performs better than so-called experts. While markets may be
superior to most alternatives, related methods for tapping the wisdom of crowds
(such as polls, the Delphi method, and competitive forecasting) may outperform
the status quo. More research is needed on these methods.

IV. CONCLUSION AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
Prediction markets provide intriguing possibilities for better crime
forecasting, both in the realm of predicting crime rates and patterns as well as the
evaluation of crime policies. While their use has never been tested in this domain,
evidence from other types of prediction markets strongly suggests that they may
yield better forecasts of future crime levels and certainly would permit more active
experimentation in public safety strategies. On this latter point, we believe that
contingent markets can be used to establish market-based assessments of the likely
causal impact of altemnative interventions, thus allowing policymakers to outsource
much of the policy-making to market forces. In many other domains of
govemnment, these decisions are already made through a market-based mechanism.
We mentioned the use of market forecasts in setting monetary policy, but
the concept is broader than this. For instance, in something as mundane as
government contracting, the contract for paper supply is open to bids from
competing firns. While economists typically emphasize the allocative role of these
auctions, a bid can also be thought of as a bet that the contractor can source paper
at the price offered. Similarly, a bid in a prediction market is a bet about some
useful piece of information. In the contracting domain, the service-providing and
information role of markets are bundled-whoever wins the auction has to provide
the government with the paper. In the criminal justice setting, one may not want to
leave service delivery (such as policing) to the market, but prediction markets offer
the possibility of markets continuing to play a complementary informational role,
perhaps in helping to determine the allocation of police resources most likely to
reduce crime.
With what we believe is a strong case for a role for markets in crime
fighting, we conclude with a modest proposal. It might be useful to start a
medium-scale prediction market, in which contracts are linked to the levels of
various UCR crimes over the next three years. We would suggest recruiting traders
from the broad community of criminologists and police chiefs across the nation,
perhaps run under the auspices of an existing criminal justice umbrella
organization, like the National Institute of Justice. We would suggest running
small-scale real-money markets, and in order to stimulate trade (and ensure that
relevant gambling laws are not breached), we would suggest that the market
sponsor fund the account of each of the first 200 invited traders with an initial
$200 grant, under the proviso that they can only withdraw funds after realizing
$500 in turnover across their trades. We would also suggest an annual
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(non-financial) award for the top trader for each quarter, to further stimulate
interest in and attention to the market. Setting up these markets is now a lot
simpler than it was a decade ago, and there are vendors willing to provide software
support for a web-mediated market for less than $10,000 per year. 11' In parallel
with these markets, we would strongly suggest collecting real-time forecasts from
competing methods, so as to provide a useful benchmark for assessing the
accuracy of the market. Subsequent expansion in the range of contracts offered
should be guided by the enthusiasm of traders, while an increasing role for these
markets in the policy process can only be earned through collecting a track record
of useful forecasts.
The lessons learned in terms of participation, contract design, and stakes
needed to generate liquidity, not to mention the accuracy of the results, will be
useful for other government entities that want to experiment with these markets.
The federal role here would be similar to that already played by various federal
agencies that are coordinating research and training in crime mapping and other
analytical tools. Given the political battles that might be fought at the local level
over rolling out a market like this, and given the overlapping federal, state, and
local jurisdictions and agencies, we believe a federal experiment makes the most
sense in the first instance. After a short while, however, given the uncertain issues
we have just highlighted in this paper, much more experimentation at the state and
local level will be needed. To that end, the federal government should encourage
(or, at least, not discourage) the deployment of these markets. Although the
science-fiction fantasy of predicting crime before it happens will likely remain just
that, the use of markets in crime fighting policy has the potential to greatly
improve the efficiency of the public safety response to crime.

Ill.
Vendors like Consensus Point (http://www.consensuspoint.coml) provide
turn-key markets and consulting for the operation of large and small online prediction
markets.
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APPENDIX:
MODELING CRIME-MARKET-POLICY-CRIME FEEDBACK LOOP
The main text describes a very simple problem: changes in some
underlying crime factor will have both a direct effect-raising the forecast level of
crime-and a partly-offsetting indirect effect, as traders in prediction markets
respond to the likelihood that policymnakers will respond to this shock, lessening its
influence. This Appendix formalizes some of the arguments made in the Article.
Throughout, we use upper-case letters to denote endogenous variables, and lowercase letters to denote exogenous factors, while Greek letters refer to parameters
12
(which are assumed common knowledge).'
Consider a simple case in which the crime rate, Y, is a function of some
underlying level of criminality, x (itself likely an index of social, legal, economic
and demographic factors), and some crime prevention measure, V By re-scaling
the variables x and V so that a one unit increase in each causes a one-unit change in
crime, we are left with:
Y=x- V
When policymnakers set the policy response V, they do so based on two
imperfect forecasts of the underlying level of crime, x-a traditional forecast
model and the forecast from a prediction market:
[2]
V = fi Traditionalforecast + y Prediction market price
We impose no structure on the traditional forecast, but simply note that it
comes with an orthogonal forecast error that we denote ft
[3]
Traditionalforecast = x+f
The prediction market price, P, comes from an efficient market, and
hence represents a statistically efficient forecast, given the market's information
set. Thus, the prediction market price is simply the market's best estimate of crime,
based on a noisy indicator of underlying criminality, x+h, where h is the noise
term:13
[4]

P = E[YjI x+h]
At this point we have only laid out our assumptions, but already this basic
setup highlights the feedback loop problem: Equation [4] shows that the prediction
112.
We have also de-meaned all of the variables, allowing us to drop relevant
constant terms.
113.
We assume that the noise term, h is iid and orthogonal to x; we do allow h to
be correlated with the equivalent noise term in the traditional forecast, f, and denote that
correlation pffi.
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market price is a forecast of the crime rate, Y but as equations [1] and [2] show,
the crime rate is itself a function of crime prevention measures, V, which in turn
are a function of the prediction market price.
Thus, prediction market prices, crime, and crime prevention, P, Y and V
are simultaneously determined. We can simply solve the system for these
endogenous variables in order to uncover the true relationship between crime,
prediction market prices and appropriate crime prevention measures.
In order to solve for the prediction market price, note that under the
assumptions made on h, that an ordinary least squares regression will yield the best
linear unbiased estimator of Y, and hence:

[51
P =EfY I x+h] = (x+h) E[(x+h)Y] /E[(x+h)2 ]
= (x+h) E[(x+h)(X -3(x+J)
-~~'

(xlah)
((/_

2

-/3

-

-

y P)]/IE[(x+h)2]
((U/2 + Uh2)

YE[(X+h)P]

The feedback loop from policy to prices is evident in the two covariance
terms, /3A and yE[(x+h)P]. This latter term still involves the endogenous variable,
P, We need to solve for the latter covariance term. Multiplying [5] by (x+h) and
taking expectations yields:
[6]

E[(X+h) p]
2
+
(0,X

=

E[ (X+h) (x+h)

(I_3)

UX2

_

flafj

_

YE[(x+h) P1)

crh)]i6

Substituting this into the previous expression yields an expression for the
prediction market price, purely in terms of exogenous variables:
[7]

p = E[YIX+h] =(x+h) ([ (-/3)

2
UX2-_ pffi0uflh](U."
+ Yh2)

(+ Y)}

This expression allows us to find the relationship between prediction
market prices and the information set of traders, x+h. The relationship between the
two is linear, and the coefficient is the expression in curly braces.
This is actually a fairly intuitive expression, although it may be helpful to
build the intuition step-by-step, by beginning with the simplest case.
In the simplest (but clearly unrealistic) case, the market observes the
underlying index of criminality, x, perfectly (and hence orh=O), and policy is
unresponsive to both types of forecast (fl=y=O). In this case, the prediction market
price simply moves one-for-one with (x+h). We do not live in this world though,
so this model builds in several factors that make its prediction more realistic.
First, we allow for the fact that market participants do not observe
criminality perfectly, but instead observe x+h, (and hence (rh>O). This leads the
prediction market forecast to move with this noisy indicator, scaled by the
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2). This result is familiar, as
+ah
it is the standard

finding that an efficient ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator in the presence of
measurement error requires attenuated forecasts.
Second, we allow for the possibility that policy responds to the traditional
forecast (J3>0). This response, designated fl, means that any crime shocks will be
further reduced to a remaining factor (1-fl), and this endogenous response is
2
understood by prediction market traders. That is, P (x+h) (1-fl) a, 2 / (Ua'
+ ah2),
and hence the response of the prediction market forecast to a rise in underlying
crime is further muted by the expected response of policy to offset this expected
rise in crime. If policy fully offsets any shocks to crime (fl=]), then the crime rate
will be orthogonal to shocks to the underlying crime factor, and hence the
prediction market price provides no information about the underlying crime factor,
x. If shocks are less than fuilly offset (O<fl<1), then the prediction market price
provides useful, albeit attenuated assessments of the underlying crime.
-

Third, in a world with crime prediction markets, policymakers also will
likely respond (somewhat) to the prediction market prices. In the model, this
response is designated by an amount y. In tum, this endogenous response to a rise
in criminality (x) will lead to a smaller impact on crime, attenuating the ultimate
impact by 1/(1± y). Since prediction market traders are aware of this feedback loop
and the relationship between the prediction market price and x will be similarly
attenuated, the market should do the same. An important finding of this model is
that as long as the policymnaker does not respond infinitely strongly to prediction
market prices (that is, y<cc), there will still be a positive (albeit attenuated)
relationship between the prediction market price and the underlying crime
factor. 11 4 This means that prediction market prices are still valuable for
policymnakers in all conceivable cases, even when reactions to underlying crime
factors are wildly overaggressive.
Fourth, we allow for the possibility that the traditional forecast and the
prediction market forecast are not independent, and hence the errors in projecting
the underlying index of criminality, x, are correlated. Consequently some of the
prediction market forecast error will be common to the traditional forecast, and
hence policy is already partly offset by the response to the traditional forecast. This
is the (rough) intuition for the-flpjhqflh term.
Finally, now that we have an expression for the prediction market price in
terms of the exogenous variables, we can solve for the crime rate and
crime-reducing measures:
YI=x- V-x -,8x~J,-

x(1-i

y~xyL

I

_ ) x-&lathJ(ax2

Oy) - fif- y~h where 6-

a~-lja

+

Oh2)

"(1fl](Ox

2

+ Uh2) (1+ )

114.
The intuition for why the limit here is here is y oo is that the more that
policymakers work to offset the rise in crime signaled by prediction market prices, the less
that prediction market prices respond to the underlying crime factor.
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Thus, crime rises with the underlying rate of criminality, x, but this affect
is partly offset by the response of policy to the traditional forecast (by an amount
,8), and partly offset by the response of policy to the prediction market forecast. Of
course, forecast errors in either model will also have an impact on crime: an
excessively high crime forecast leads to the deployment of extra crime-fighting
resources, which results in a lower crime rate than if the forecast error had not
occurred.
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